1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
-
South Asia
East Asia
Middle East
Southern Africa
1931- 2022
1931- 2007
1928- 2014
1953- 2007
June 27, 1991
The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for Thursday, 27 June describes the latest developments in Yugoslavia, USSR, Cambodia, Philippines and India.
July 25, 1991
The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 25 July 1991 describes the latest developments in Iraq, Kuwait, the Soviet Union, Israel, Lebanon, ASEAN, South Africa, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Pakistan and Middle East.
May 9, 1991
The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 9 May 1991 describes the latest developments in Iraq, Kuwait, Israel, Lebanon, the Soviet Union, India, Pakistan, Yemen, Cambodia, the United Nations and Panama.
October 26, 1990
The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 26 October 1990 describes the latest developments in Iran, Kuwait, the Soviet Union, Lebanon, Pakistan, New Zealand and Gulf States.
October 24, 1989
The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 24 October 1989 describes the latest developments in the Soviet Union, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, and Colombia.
August 10, 1989
The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 10 August 1989 describes the latest developments in Israel, Lebanon, Iran, Panama, the Soviet Union, China, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, South Korea, and West Germany.
July 1991
With the term “weapons of mass destruction” having not yet fully come into general usage, this NIE used the term “special weapons” to describe nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (formerly the term “special weapons” was sometimes used to describe nuclear weapons only). With numerous excisions, including the names of some countries in the sections on “East Asia and the Pacific” and “Central America,” this wide-ranging estimate provides broad-brushed, sometimes superficial, pictures of the situations in numerous countries along with coverage of international controls to halt sensitive technology exports to suspect countries.
February 1985
For years, U.S. intelligence agencies did not take seriously Muammar Gaddafi’s efforts to develop a Libyan nuclear capability and this report provides early evidence of the perspective that the Libyan program “did not know what it was doing.” According to the CIA, the program’s “serious deficiencies,” including “poor leadership” and lack of both “coherent planning” and trained personnel made it “highly unlikely the Libyans will achieve a nuclear weapons capability within the next 10 years.” The Libyan effort was in such a “rudimentary stage” that they were trying to acquire any technology that would be relevant to producing plutonium or enriched uranium.
November 1985
This heavily excised report on the “well-educated committed cadre” that managed the Pakistani nuclear program demonstrates how the CIA protects its intelligence on Pakistani nuclear activities. This is the same version of the report that can be found on the Agency’s FOIA Web page; the recent version includes no new information. Details on Khan Research Laboratories and the gas centrifuge program are entirely withheld, but some information is made available on the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission and the Directorate of Nuclear Fuels and Materials. The latter includes details on the status and purpose of major projects, for example, the Kundian Nuclear Complex, also known as the Chasma Reprocessing Plant, which was not completed until 1990. For the purposes of producing plutonium for weapons, the Pakistanis were interested in a heavy water moderated reactor of the NRX (National Research Experimental) type that Canada built at Chalk River. In 1985, the Pakistanis started that project in earnest, with construction beginning in 1987 of what became known as Khushab Chemical Plant II.
December 1982
This CIA report on India, “India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States,” has comparatively few excisions. It discusses in some detail Indian efforts to support its nuclear power and nuclear weapons development program by circumventing international controls through purchases of sensitive technology on “gray markets.” The report depicts a “growing crisis in the Indian civil nuclear program,” which combined with meeting nuclear weapons development goals, was forcing India to expand imports of nuclear-related supplies. The purchasing activities posed a “direct challenge to longstanding US efforts to work with other supplier nations … for tighter export controls.”