With proliferation becoming a “greater threat to US interests over the next five years,” intelligence analysts believed that the “disruptive aspect of the proliferation phenomenon will constitute the greater threat to the United States.” While the estimators saw “low potential” for terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons, the likelihood of terrorist/extortionist hoaxes was on the upswing. Significant portions of the NIE are excised, especially the estimate of Israel’s nuclear arsenal and its impact in the Middle East. Nevertheless, much information remains on the countries of greatest concern: Iraq and Libya in the Near East, India and Pakistan in South Asia, Brazil and Argentina in Latin America, and the Republic of South Africa, as well as those of lesser concern: Iran, Egypt, Taiwan and the two Koreas.

Description of the reaction to the Asian-African Conference in both participating countries and capitalist ruled countries.

Just a few months into President Reagan’s first term his administration wanted to make its own mark on nonproliferation policy. The report suggests building “broader bilateral relationship[s]” and offering political and security incentives could persuade states considering developing nuclear weapons to cease these efforts.

Contains memos issued by the General Military Intelligence Directorate (GMID), last dated 6 July 1988, regarding the following issues: The use of chemical weapons by the Iranian Army during the Iran-Iraq War, stating dates and places where they were used; the attempts of Iran to produce chemical weapons relying on the assistance of North Korea, Syria and West Germany; developing some Iranian insecticide factories to be able to produce chemical weapons; types of chemical weapons which are used or produced by Iran, such
as mustard Gas, C factor, phosgene factor, white phosphorus, sarin gas. Page 27 contains correspondence by the Iraqi Military Attache Office in Cairo to the GMID, dated 14 September 1988, regarding information received from the Egyptian Intelligence about Iran's attempts to obtain chemical weapons from Spain through mediators and to provide Libya with chemical weapons in return for supplying Scud B missiles.

This file contains a meeting between Saddam and the members of the Ba'ath Party in all the Arab countries. Saddam talked about the role of the Ba'ath Party in controlling the Islamic current in the whole Islamic world and the Arab countries. He said that it isn't a profitable trend to contend with these currents, but rather to negotiate with them and try to persuade them that it is inevitable and better to separate between religious thought and command. He talked about the current of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. He stressed that this movement must be exploited to be an ally rather than an enemy. This movement and others similar to it must be persuaded to work with the Ba'ath Party and not against it.

Transcript of a meeting between President Saddam Hussein amd Iraqi officials, taking place sometime between 4-20 November 1979. Saddam discusses relations with Europe, Russia, China, the Gulf countries, and the United States. Iraqi officials criticize Libya and Syria for their support to Iran. Another official criticizes the Egyptian President Anwar Al-Sadat for his attitudes in making peace agreement with Israel. Saddam accuses the Americans of playing a central role in overthrowing the Shah of Iran.

Ulbricht informs Brezhnev about his visit to the UAR following an invitation from Nasser. He also says that he wants to get in contact with the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs in order to establish a common line to present to the UAR. Ulbricht also announces a visit to the SAR and Iraq.

This 25 April 1974 directive from the Centre is attributed to an author identified as “Sviridov.” It was sent to KGB Line A residencies in Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Aden, Samaa, and others, and contains instructions for planning “active measures.”

“Sviridov” identified a variety of channels through which the KGB could influence Middle Eastern governments, militaries, and political groups, while suppressing anti-Soviet groups. Additionally, the residencies were instructed to plan active measures in advance to prepare for future contingencies.

In an explanatory note, Mitrokhin explains that “Sviridov” is a pseudonym for then KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov, and that Line A is the arm of the KGB concerned with active measures intended to influence foreign countries.

Ivan Bashev presents a report on the CPSU-organized meeting in Warsaw, where Eastern European government officials exchanged views on the situation in the Middle East. Among the discussed topics were the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Yemeni Civil War, and recent developments in Iraq.