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Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Cuba's National Capitol Building, January 2010.

Central America and Caribbean

Cuba

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

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South America

Brazil

President Ronald Reagan, Vice-President Bush, and oviet General Secretary Gorbachev

United States-Soviet Relations

Fidel Castro, 1959.

Castro, Fidel

1926- 2016

Cuban Foreign Relations

Nikita Khrushchev at the UNGA, 1962.

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich

1894- 1971

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Eastern Europe

Poland

Photograph of Secretary General of the United Nations U Thant

Thant, U

1909- 1974

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Anastas Mikoyan in 1959

Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich

1895- 1978

China and Latin America and the Caribbean

Photograph of John F. Kennedy in 1963

Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald)

1917- 1963

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Bastian Pinto, Luiz Leivas

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Sino-Indian Border War, 1962

Sino-Soviet Relations

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October 24, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 24 October 1962 On the Cuban Crisis situation, Jelen says that Soviet Ambassador Aleksandr Alekseyev is optimistic but Brazilian Ambassador Luis Bastian Pinto is concerned. Jelen also gives his own impressions of the crisis, saying that "There’s a relative run on the stores, but without any signs of panic and fears of the threat of military operations."
October 23, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 23 October 1962 In a conversation with Charles Bartlett (a journalist who had befriended President Kennedy), Drozniak learns more of the Cuban Crisis situation and of US-USSR relations, including that the steps taken to address the crisis (the quarentine of Cuba) were implemented by Kennedy in the atmosphere of great pressure from the public opinion.
October 20, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak) Drozniak compiles information he has collected from US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler and US Ambassador at Large Llewellyn E. Thompson on the rising Cuban situation and US-USSR relations.
October 18, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 18 October 1962 Drozniak forwards a report from US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs [Edwin M.] Martin. Martin says that the Americans are well-informed of the military situation in Cuba, that Cuba does not possess nuclear weapons (nor will they be likely to because the USSR did not give such weapons to China, so why would they give them to Cuba?), that the level of the Cuban economy is twenty-five percent lower than the period before Fidel Castro came to power and Cuba is much more economically dependent on the USSR, and finally that any military invasion or complete blockade of Cuba would be considered an act of war by the USSR.
October 18, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 18 October 1962 Drozniak discusses the possibility of US military action against Cuba, as well as Cuba's foreign relations with the USSR and the US.
September 14, 1962	Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 14 September 1962 Jelen discusses a conversation he had with [Foreign Minister Raúl] Roa [García] on 9 September. They discussed diplomatic visits, UN delegation sessions, and growing tensions in the 'Cuban situation' and possible US military action against Cuba.
November 1, 1963	Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 1 November 1963 Van Roijen writes to Amsterdam from Washington on a meeting between him and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Rusk says there are now no more Soviet military personnel stationed in Cuba, although there are still technicians and instructors remaining. The belief is those too will soon leave after training the Cuban forces has completed. Rusk notes the icy relations between Moscow and Havana now, notably regarding Castro's refusal to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
March 19, 1963	Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 19 March 1963 Boissevain writes of the continued presence of Russian military and economic advisors in Cuba, which are causes for concern. The ongoing question is for how long they will remain in Cuba and when do they leave. Boissevain says that last week approximately 1,000 advisors left the country, but with some note of resistance. However, the departure for them is a great relief for the average Cuban and Russian alike.
December 27, 1962	Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 27 December 1962 Van Roijen continues on the conversation he had with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk from the last cable. Rusk believes Cuba may be aligning more with China and is factoring in Chinese interests in Cuba. However, Rusk also saw Chinese initiatives in North Korea and North Vietnam. The relationship with China is, in his words, "not a long-term worry like Moscow but a short-term worry."
December 27, 1962	Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 27 December 1962 The cable concerns a conversation between Dutch ambassador J. Herman van Roijen and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Rusk said the Cuban issue still was a source of concern, with the upcoming anniversary of the Cuban Revolution, and was concerned about Havana in particular. Rusk conjectured that one of three things would happen: 1) Castro would announce joining the Non-Aligned Movement; 2) The extremists within the Communist Party would overthrow Castro; 3) A revolution against both Castro and the Russians would be mounted. The conversation concludes with Rusk complimenting President Kennedy for his aggressive yet prudent stance against the Soviets during the crisis.