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Documents

July 4, 1972

Henry Kissinger to President Nixon, 'Proposed NSSM on the Implications of an Indian Nuclear Test,' with cover memorandum from Richard T. Kennedy

National security assistant Henry Kissinger asks President Nixon to approve a proposal for a national security study memorandum [NSSM] on the implications of an Indian nuclear test for U.S. interests.

April 22, 1969

Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to William P. Rogers, US-French Military Relations

This is a follow up of a memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon that was sent on April 15, 1969, where Nixon approved Kissinger to tell the Secretary of State the same points that were discussed in the original memorandum. Such points were that Kissinger has told Healey, British Defense Minister, that the French have not approached the U.S. for military assistance, and that any decision to aid France would have to be heavily weighed beforehand. The necessity for secrecy on these topics is stressed by Kissinger.

July 1, 1982

Minutes of Todor Zhivkov – Richard Nixon Conversation, Euxinograd Residence [Bulgaria]

March 29, 1971

National Security Decision Memorandum 103, 'Military Cooperation with France'

Outlines President Nixon's decisions regarding France's request for military aid with their nuclear program. The restrictions on exporting advanced computers will be loosened, allowing France to import more powerful models. Limited technical assistance for their ballistic missile program will be offered, but only in areas that won't jeopardize US security or "provide France with a distinct new capability."

June 2007

About the Middle East. Folder 81. The Chekist Anthology

Information on the situation in the Middle East prepared by KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov in April 1973, prior to a 7 May 1973 discussion in the Politburo.

Andropov stated that given the increase in anti-Israeli propaganda in Egypt and Syria, as well as the heightened state of readiness of their armies, it was possible that a coalition of Middle Eastern states could resume military operations against Israel before, or during the upcoming Nixon-Brezhnev summit.

To prevent this, the KGB initiated a series of active measures. Specifically, they dispatched KPSU Politburo Candidate Member K.G. Mazurov to speak with Egyptian President Sadat and Syrian President Assad on the USSR’s behalf; informed the United States government through unofficial channels that a resumption of hostilities in the Middle East was not in Moscow’s interests; delayed the delivery of new Soviet surface to surface missiles to Egypt; and dispatched a well known Soviet journalist specializing in Middle Eastern affairs to Cairo and Damascus to study the situation.

February 24, 1970

Memorandum of Conversation, Nixon and Pompidou

Minutes of a conversation between President Nixon and President Pompidou during the latter's visit to the United States. Nixon states that he wants there to be good relations between the U.S. and France because, despite differences in approach, both countries share the same goals. The two countries were allies and should find common grounds for cooperation even though France wanted to maintain its independence from NATO. Pompidou points out differences with the U.S. in terms of military and nuclear capabilities, and Nixon recognizes the highly secretive nature of such talks which might lead to a better military cooperation between both countries. Next, they discussed how the Soviet Union presented problems for both countries, and that the Soviets must not be allowed to gain an advantage because of any agreements between France and the U.S. It concludes with an overview of the state of affairs with China, the U.S., and an independent France in a world that is progressing forward at a rapid pace since the end of the last war.

March 10, 1970

Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to President Nixon, 'Follow-up Actions on Military Cooperation with the French'

Kissinger seeks Nixon’s approval on certain points regarding military cooperation with France. He seeks and receives approval to convey a message to Goodpaster to increase theatrical and naval cooperation with France; to rescind the U.S.-French R&D Steering Committee dealing with military technology; to deal with specific French requests for military assistance via Laird; and to convey a message to Prime Minister Wilson about U.S.-French military cooperation. The end of the document is the memorandum itself to Goodpaster from Kissinger on the points approved by Nixon to be sent to him.

Pagination