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April 5, 1965

Note of Polish-Soviet Talks in Warsaw on 5 April 1965

Exceprts from Polish-Soviet talks on 5 April 1965 that concern the Cuban issue. Brezhnev discusses the recent visit by Raul Castro, that they have very good relations and that the Cuban leaders are worried about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba. Kosygin discusses the fact that China is becoming more isolated and what that does for relations between Asia and Latin America.

May 6, 1963

Letter from Nikita Khrushchev to Władysław Gomułka regarding Sugar Prices

Khrushchev writes a letter to Gomulka in which he discusses the recent changes in Cuban sugar prices on the world market. Khrushchev wishes to inform Gomulka of what steps the Soviet Union is doing to adjust prices to these fluctuations.

April 13, 1964

Note of Polish-Soviet Talks in Moscow on 13-15 April 1964

Exceprts from a Polish-Soviet talk in Moscow in April 1964 that are about the Cuban issue. Specifically, they are about each country's sugar trade values with Cuba.

October 31, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

Representatives from Brazil and Yugoslavia discuss the Brazilian proposal to the United Nations (1) denuclearization of Latin America, 2) Cuba will not interfere politically with its neighbors, and 3) guaranteed sovereignty for Cuba), about various leader's opinions on the resolution and about the difficulty that might be involved in the implementation of these policies.

October 31, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

The Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro tells the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry about Brazil's proposal to the United Nations (denuclearization of Latin America, Cuba will not export revolutionary operations, Cuban guarantee of independence) and about how difficult it might be to implement the various aspects of this resolution. For example, when it comes to discussions of the evacuation of Guantanamo, Americans "stop their ears."

October 31, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry expressing their pleasure with Tito’s message.

October 31, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

The Yugoslav Embassy in Havana and Ambassador Vidakovic tell the Foreign Ministry that Yugoslavia has been mentioned in Cuban press articles for their involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis. He also discusses other popular headlines about the crisis situation.

November 2, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, to Yugoslav Embassies in Havana and Washington and the Yugoslav Mission to the United Nations, New York

The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry relays to its embassies a summary of the Brazilian proposal on the Cuban Missile Crisis which, they say, mainly includes: the denuclearization of Latin America with inspections, Cuba's commitment to not "export" revolutionary operations, and guarantees to Cuba for sovereignty and independence. Allegedly, Castro welcomed the idea of the above plan. Brazil thinks that the USA could accept it after negotiations.

October 31, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Mexico (Vlahov) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

Yugoslav officials remark that significant publicity and acknowledgment was given to Tito’s message and initiative in regard to Brazilian President João Goulart’s messages, and Yugoslavia's activity in the UNO [United Nations Organization] has solidified their reputation as that of the nonaligned.

October 30, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

Fidel Castro, after his first contacts with Brazilian President João Goulart’s special envoy Albino Silva, accepted well the Brazilian thesis which contains following: Denuclearization of the whole of Latin America and the embargo on atomic weapons delivery; Inspection by UN; Cuba would commit neither to export revolution nor to carry out any subversive activities; Cuba would be given guarantees for keeping its sovereignty and independence. The USA will accept the plan after negotiations. Russians “couldn’t think of anything better.”

Pagination