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November 11, 1962

Telegram from Nikita Khrushchev to Anastas Mikoyan

This telegram, written in Khrushchev's stream-of-consciousness style, outlines the rationale behind the decision to remove the missiles from Cuba that caused the crisis: It was much better to end the crisis by giving up planes that were already obsolete—to show that the Soviet Union and Cuba had fulfilled all the promises Khrushchev had given Kennedy—and consequently to expect, and demand, full compliance with the non-invasion pledge on the part of the United States, than to retain the planes and give the Americans a justification to violate their pledge. The telegram also spells out, in Khrushchev’s words, of the reasons why the weapons were deployed to Cuba in the first place.

December 3, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 71

Protocol 71 gives details to the immediate fallout of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet perspective. Thanks to Castro’s so-called Armageddon letter and his five points, by December 1962 (date of this protocol), Khrushchev was calling the Cubans “unreliable allies.”

November 16, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 66

Protocol 66 is the first Malin note dated after the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 11 November. The tone of the protocol indicates that Castro is not pleased with Khrushchev's handling of the crisis, and there is a growing sense of distance between Cuba and the Soviet Union.

October 28, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 63

According to Protocol 63, Khrushchev probably assumed that Kennedy’s patience was at an end and the Cuban Missile Crisis might either be resolved or spin out of control, and the Kremlin again considered how it might respond to a US attack. If anyone suggested a preemptive strike, or even a retaliatory strike, against a target outside of the Caribbean, Malin did not note it for the official record.

November 8, 1962

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba, 'A Brief Report of a Cuban Military Intelligence Official’s Talk'

According to military intelligence, the situation between US and Cuba has "calmed down". There are fewer fly-overs and the American Navy has backed away from Cuban territory.

November 9, 1962

Cable from the Military Attache of the Chinese Embassy in Iraq, 'Mercenaries Used by United States to Invade Cuba'

The Chinese Embassy in Iraq passes on information from the Cuban Embassy about forces prepared by the CIA for an invasion of Cuba, claiming they included armed anti-Castro exiles of the Cuban Revolutionary Council as well as a separate group of "special agents committed to sabotage and subversion operations."

November 10, 1962

Cable from the Chinese Embassy to the Soviet Union, 'A Report of the Speech Given By the Chief Editor of the Soviet Weekly Za Rubezhom'

On the 31st of October, the chief editor of the Soviet weekly, Za Rubezhom delivered a report on current events in the Moscow Agriculture College. Regarding the Cuba problem and the Sino-Indian border problem.

November 12, 1962

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba, 'A Report of the Conversation with the Deputy Editor of Noticias de Hoy, Raúl Valdes Vivo'

A report of a conversation from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba detailing the situation different Latin American countries face in regards to US-Cuba relations, especially in terms of the US economic and naval blockade.

November 13, 1962

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba, 'A Report of the Conversation between Chargé d’Affaires Huang Wenyou, and Cuban Deputy Foreign Minister Pelegrin Torras'

The conversation described in the report covered Cuba's situation with the UN and the Sino-Indian border problem.

October 27, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 62

Protocol 62 illustrates how it was Khrushchev who raised the stakes during the missile crisis and dictated a new letter to Kennedy indicating he would only remove the missiles from Cuba in exchange of the United States withdrawing its military bases from Turkey and Pakistan. The Pakistan demand would later be dropped, however and the US would only agree to remove its IRBMs from Turkey.

Pagination