Boissevain writes in continuation of the previous cable regarding Castro's desire for a mediator in an agreement with the United States. The Swiss or Czech ambassadors are offered as alternatives by Boissevain. Castro also notes that the Cuban debt to the Soviet Union is far to large, although he still wishes to continue revolution, creating this impasse between Cuba and the United States.

Boissevain writes of a conversation Fidel Castro had with his wife, namely about how some ideals cannot translate into reality. Castro is interested in pursuing an agreement of some kind with the United States, and seeks to use Boissevain as the middle man. Boissevain is hesitant about any kind of deal with Castro, and asks for instructions on how to proceed.

The cable from van Roijen concerns a conversation between him and Director of UN Political Affairs at the U.S. Department of State Joseph Sisco. Sisco informs van Roijen that the Kennedy Administration has decided to let the Cuban issue quietly die, boiling down to the United States and the Soviet Union "agreeing to disagree." The State Department does not think there should be further debate on the issue in the UN Security Council because the U.S. is not willing to make further concessions while there have been no UN inspections. Sisco also reports that the Soviets have made a commitment to withdraw all combat troops from Cuba.

Boissevain reports on the ongoing cold war between the United States and Cuba and its effect on Cuban society. Cuba's national airport is maintaining service to Mexico city but is marked by continued delays and cancellations. Trade is limited only to Cuban and Spanish ships flying under the flag of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Kennedy's latest address heralds more hardship for the Cuban people. The letter concludes with the prospect of Japan buying Cuban sugar based on a meeting with Japanese Ambassador to Cuba Rokuzo Yaguchi.

Boissevain explains the previous disjointed cable sent to Amsterdam on 26 November. Anastas Mikoyan gave a farewell speech which contained old communist platitudes and admiration for the Cuban people. He makes references to Fidel Castro several times, but ironically Castro is not with Mikoyan, instead retreating to Havana University. The leader revealed a manifesto entitled "Cuba's Answer to Kennedy," which contained: a reiteration of Castro's Five Points, the demand of a UN investigation into U.S.-led attacks on Cuban military bases, the Cuban right to defend itself, and a statement regarding lack of faith in Kennedy's promises of nonaggression. In Boissevain's mind this will serve to only aggravate both the Soviet Union and the United States, and, in his words, "an anxious time begins."

Boissevain writes how nationalistic fervor is at the fever pitch in Cuba. He comments on widespread use of slogans and propaganda posters everywhere in Havana and the effects they have on the average Cuban. Despite the end of the military blockade against Cuba, tensions still run high between Castro and Kennedy. The island is now "completely isolated" resulting in severe shipping delays from Europe, if any arrive at all.

Van Roijen cables from Washington about a conversation he had with British Ambassador to the United States David Ormsby-Gore. Ormsby-Gore explains the possible reaction from Moscow to the defeat suffered in the crisis as twofold: Those who are of the opinion that Khrushchev will make a countermove, while those whose judgment is that Khrushchev has finally understood that the Americans in fact are willing to fight for their vital national interests has learned severe lessons for future Soviet policy in the Cold War. Both van Roijen and Ormsby-Gore that perhaps the most decisive moment of the whole crisis was the American blockade of Cuba herself. The cable concludes with Ormsby-Gore addressing the possibilities of hidden missiles in Cuba, to which he claims aerial reconnaissance has not produced any evidence to support this.

The cable concerns a conversation between Dutch Ambassador to the United States van Roijen and Director Ward P. Allen of the State Department's Bureau of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, regarding further actions of the Organization of American States (OAS) in the aftermath of the Cuban crisis. Allen made note that he had very little information regarding Cuba and how Cuba would fit into future dealings with the OAS.

Dutch Ambassador to the United States J. Herman van Roijen sends a cable on a conversation he had with a member of the U.S. State Department. Firstly, the State Department was pleased to know Indonesian President Sukarno had not pledged support to Cuba during the crisis. Secondly, they hoped to make the point to Sukarno how alliance with the Soviets could not be relied upon, as the Cuban crisis and the Soviet abandonment of India have demonstrated. Thirdly, the Indonesian Ambassador Zain was going to pay six week visit to Jakarta, in an effort to promote U.S. economic support to Indonesia.

Boissevain writes about a conversation between Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa and Brazilian Ambassador Luis Bastian Pinto. The conversation revolves around Castro's Five Points, and Roa claims they are not aimed at the United States but rather the Soviet Union whose concession to remove the missiles greatly disturbed Castro. The Brazilian Ambassador though the Cubans asked too much, while Roa said these points are negotiable.