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November 18, 1947

Letter from Louise Yim to H.E. Dr. V.K. Wellington Koo

Louise Yim writes to Wellington Koo to acknowledge the Republic of China's participation in the UN Temporary Commission in Korea.

September 23, 1977

Notes on Meetings held in the Great Hall of the People in Peking, on 3 and 4 August 1977 at 3 PM

Huang Hua, commenting on a number of developments around the world, suggests that China's foreign policy continues to emulate the thinking and concerns of Mao Zedong.

August 31, 1978

Record of Conversation with H.E. Mr. William H. Gleysteen, Jr.

Ambassadors Gleysteen and Miller discuss relations between North Korea and South Korea and the regional situation in Northeast Asia in 1978.

July 1982

National Intelligence Estimate, NIE-4-82, 'Nuclear Proliferation Trends Through 1987'

With proliferation becoming a “greater threat to US interests over the next five years,” intelligence analysts believed that the “disruptive aspect of the proliferation phenomenon will constitute the greater threat to the United States.” While the estimators saw “low potential” for terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons, the likelihood of terrorist/extortionist hoaxes was on the upswing. Significant portions of the NIE are excised, especially the estimate of Israel’s nuclear arsenal and its impact in the Middle East. Nevertheless, much information remains on the countries of greatest concern: Iraq and Libya in the Near East, India and Pakistan in South Asia, Brazil and Argentina in Latin America, and the Republic of South Africa, as well as those of lesser concern: Iran, Egypt, Taiwan and the two Koreas.

April 9, 1981

Special Assistant for NPI, NFAC, CIA, to Resource Management Staff, Office of Program Assessment et al, 'Request for Review of Draft Paper on the Security Dimension of Non-Proliferation'

Just a few months into President Reagan’s first term his administration wanted to make its own mark on nonproliferation policy. The report suggests building “broader bilateral relationship[s]” and offering political and security incentives could persuade states considering developing nuclear weapons to cease these efforts.