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Documents

November 26, 1953

Letter, Syngman Rhee to John W. Staggers

Syngman Rhee response to "Jack" of Phillips Associates regarding an offer of seed corn to distribute in Korea. He mentions issues with the Indian Custodial Force who were guarding prisoners of war following the armistice agreement.

July 27, 1953

President Eisenhower to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee)

Eisenhower informs Rhee that US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles will be visiting Korea shortly.

August 7, 1953

Summary Record of the Conference held between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles (Third Session)

President Rhee and Secretary Dulles have concluded the final negotiations for the US-ROK defense pact and now both believe it is time to inform the American and Korean public. Rhee emphasizes that he will not accept Korean neutralization and it is imperative to remove the Chinese from the north. Dulles states that the US will do its best to unify Korea under one peaceful government and will try to remove the Chinese aggressors in the north.

August 3, 1953

Confidential Memorandum, Before Agreeing to the Armistice Agreement

When the United States agreed to a truce talk to end the Korea War, President Syngman Rhee disapproved. He opposed the truce and tried to attack these peace proceedings through a serious of events- such as releasing thousands of prisoners of war and creating turmoil for the US government. In order to persuade Rhee to accept the armistice defense, the US dispatches Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson to meet with the South Korean president in a series of bargaining discussions. Eventually, under certain conditions and a mutual defense pact with the US, Rhee agrees to the armistice.

August 14, 1953

Memorandum, President Syngman Rhee to All Diplomatic Officials

Following the ratification of the Armistice Agreement and the Mutual Defense Treaty, President Rhee conveys that he expects the Armistice to fail because the communists will “undoubtedly” violate it and undermine Korean independence. Rhee wants to renew war to secure victory but most importantly to strengthen the ROK-U.S alliance. Following the memorandum he makes twelve points ranging from topic like Korean rehabilitation to prisoners of war from the Korean War.

May 4, 1953

Letter, General Duk Shin Choi to General William K. Harrison, Jr. on Civilian Internees

From April 20 to May 3 1953, Operation Little Switch allowed the exchange of the sick and wounded prisoners of wars between the United Nations, North Korea, and China. In this letter, Major General Choi informs General Harrison that the communist have failed to return hundreds of U.N. POWs because of their broad interpretation of the agreement. General Choi provides a series of steps to improve this agreement but most importantly he urges that the terms “civilian internees” and “displaced person” should be clarified in the Draft Armistice Agreement.

June 6, 1953

Statement by President Syngman Rhee

President Syngman Rhee strongly opposed the peace talks between the United Nations, the North Korea People’s Army, and the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army. Rhee proposed that he would accept this armistice only if the United States signed a Mutual Defense Pact and to continue to build the ROK forces after the war.

May 2, 1979

Main Points of the Talks with Foreign Minister Ho Dam of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 2 May 1979

Kurt Waldheim and Heo Dam discuss the Korean armistice and the possibilities for dialogue between the two Koreas.

July 27, 1953

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to President Eisenhower

Rhee thanks Eisenhower for US appropriations for South Korea and congratulates him on the Korean War armistice.

July 7, 1953

National Security Council Report, NSC 157/1, 'US Objective with Respect to Korea Following an Armistice'

NSC 157/1 analyzes the situation following the armistice in Korea and the problem of Korea's division in half. The report analyzes the North Korea/Communist, US, and South Korean positions regarding reunification. Although a unified Korea allied militarily with the US is not seen as a possibility, the report concludes that it might still be possible to achieve "a unified, neutralized Korea under a substantially unchanged ROK [South Korea]."

Pagination