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August 11, 1959

Letters to Dag Hammarskjold on the Japanese-Korean Fishery Conflict

Correspondences between Dag Hammarskjold and Hans Gottfurcht on the issue of fishery conflict between Korea and Japan.

November 23, 1971

Letters between Narasimhan and Ozbudun

Ozbudun updates Narasimhan on domestic and international affairs in ROK. The 9th preliminary Red Cross talks made no progress. The ROK government worries that PRC's entry in the UN will affect the UN Korean question discussion. A Russian reporter may visit Seoul to sound out potential trade relations. Japan decides to forgo trade and banking relations with North Korea.

June 18, 1971

Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan

Kuzbari updates Narasimhan on the UN Command's proposal to clear the DMZ for civilian use, the need to validate ROK's accusations against North Korean seaborne attacks, Japan's view that ROK should adapt to communist China's entry into the UN, and the changing liberal attitude of the Korean people in regards to unification.

April 10, 1970

Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan

Principal Secretary of UNCURK Kuzbari updates Chef de Cabinet of the UN C.V. Narasimhan on the JAL flight hijacking incident's implications on ROK-Japan relations, UN Command and DPRK meeting on Armistice violations, and renewed DMZ incidents.

April 3, 1970

Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan

Principal Secretary of UNCURK Kuzbari updates Chef de Cabinet of the UN C.V. Narasimhan on the "Samurai" incident when a radical Japanese student group called Zekigun hijacked a JAL Boeing 747 and the 31 March 1970 UN Command and DPRK meeting.

March 13, 1970

Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan

Principal Secretary of UNCURK Zouheir Kuzbari writes Chef de Cabinet of the UN C.V. Narasimhan about the partial reshuffle in the ROK Cabinet, worsening ROK-Japan relations, and satisfaction over the postponement of U.S. force reduction in the ROK.

February 27, 1970

Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan

Principal Secretary of UNCURK Zouheir Kuzbari writes Chef de Cabinet of the UN C.V. Narasimhan about ROK-Japan relationship: an ROK Foreign Ministry request to ban all trade between DPRK and private Japanese firms and the Japanese allowance of U.S. military bases in Japan on the basis of ROK defense.

February 6, 1970

Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan

Principal Secretary of UNCURK Zouheir Kuzbari updates Chef de Cabinet C.V. Narasimhan on the request for the repatriation of passengers and crew of the KAL plane that landed in North Korea and the argument between ROK and Japanese governments over a reported germs deal between a Japanese firm and North Korean commercial representatives.

February 8, 1979

Cable from the British Embassy in Tokyo to the British Embassy in Seoul, 'Visit of Deng Xiaoping'

A summary of remarks made by Deng Xiaoping to Japanese officials regarding developments on the Korean Peninsula.

January 20, 1966

National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-66, 'The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation'

This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.

Pagination