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Documents

May 12, 1964

Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Dean Rusk, UK Foreign Secretary Butler, and French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, 'Tripartite Discussion of Non-Dissemination'

In this discussion between Rusk and the British and French Foreign Ministers, the three discuss a proposed British nonproliferation declaration. Rusk had no objection but Couve de Murville found the declaration “patronizing” because it said “in effect that we [nuclear weapons states] are sinners and don’t want others to join us in sin.”

September 15, 1994

Preparatory Committee for the 1995 Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 'European Union (EU): NPT Extension Options and Modalities'

European Union document on legal aspects in connection with the NPT.

July 19, 1994

Council of the European Union, 'Joint Action Regarding Preparation for the 1995 Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'

The EU Working Group on Non-Proliferation developed the first draft what later became the Council Decision 94/509/CFSP. The draft identified three decisions: to convince states outside the Treaty to join it; to encourage participation in the remaining Preparatory Committee meetings;and to build consensus for indefinite extension. The proposal was a so-called “A” Item, meaning that the Foreign Ministers would not even discuss it; they only were to approve it.

October 22, 1976

Cable No. 17944, US Embassy Bonn to the Secretary of State, 'Expulsions of North Korean Diplomats from Scandinavian Countries'

An official at the American Embassy in Bonn discusses the North Korean smuggling scandals in Scandinavia, suggests possible connections between the scandals and North Korean Embassies elsewhere in Europe, and confirms the absence of North Korean smuggling in the Federal Republic of Germany.

December 7, 1954

Department of State, Memorandum, 'Problems Involving the Satellites and Baltic Areas in Negotiations with the Soviet Union'

Negotiation of a collective security or non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union would "arouse grave anxiety or cynical reserve" due to a number of problems.

February 27, 1986

Brussels to Department of External Affairs (Canada), 'Zero Option and the Europeans'

Canadian officials warned of disagreement to come between the Europeans and the Americans over the “zero option,” the longstanding proposal to reduce both US and Soviet INF to zero. This dispatch from Brussels reported “substantial unhappiness” amongst the Europeans that the United States and the Soviet Union would discuss disarmament “even if neither of them believed in it.” Nuclear deterrence had prevented war in Europe for the preceding four decades, and US-Soviet discussions of disarmament only made it even more difficult to convince public opinion of deterrence’s continued importance

February 19, 1986

Brussels–NATO (BNATO) to Department of External Affairs (Canada), 'Alliance Problems Over INF'

In a flurry of cables from February 1986, Canadian assessments focused on a chronic issue within NATO: consultation within the alliance. As this dispatch from Brussels concluded, paraphrasing Winston Churchill, “NATO nuclear collective consultation is the worst form, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

February 17, 1986

Washington, DC to Department of External Affairs (Canada), 'Alliance Problems Over INF'

In a flurry of cables from February 1986, Canadian assessments focused on a chronic issue within NATO: in consultation within the alliance. The Special Consultative Group was used as a forum to “air views of allies,” hold briefings on the current state of negotiations, and to share a new negotiating position right before it was tabled. Canadian officials also warned of disagreement to come between the Europeans and the Americans over the “zero option,” the longstanding proposal to reduce both US and Soviet INF to zero.

October 24, 1945

Memorandum of a Conversation between W.A. Harriman and Stalin

W.A. Harriman and Stalin discuss post-war peace treaties and discuss who will be invited to participate in negotiations in the European war.

February 21, 1962

Research Memorandum RSB-58 from Roger Hilsman to the Secretary, 'Probable Soviet Reaction to Establishment of Multilateral NATO-Controlled MRBM Force'

As discussion of a NATO multilateral force (MLF) unfolded, unfolded, one question which had to be addressed was how the Soviet Union would respond to the creation of such a NATO force. Because a NATO force would increase Western military capabilities, Soviet opposition was assumed.

Pagination