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October 10, 1975

George Vest to Mr. Sonnenfeldt, 'British Comprehensive Safeguards Initiative re Suppliers Conference'

This document describes the differing views regarding safeguards. The Canadians strongly supported the former, “full scope safeguards” (their terminology, which caught on), which the French saw as “tantamount to imposing NPT obligations”--a reference to the Treaty’s Article III--which they would not accept. Arguing that full-scope safeguards was “alien to [their] philosophy,” the French suggested that a “traditional interpretation of the contamination principle (i.e., requiring safeguards on any materials produced in exported facilities),” would make it possible to achieve “the practical equivalent” of the Canadian proposal.

June 19, 1975

U.S. Embassy London telegram 9376 to State Department, 'Nuclear Export Policy: Bilaterals with FRG'

The U.S. delegation agreed to develop a policy paper that would take into account French and other views so as to reach agreement on the most “stringent” safeguards possible. A central but divisive issue was whether safeguards should apply to the entire nuclear fuel cycle (later known as “full-scope” safeguards). Another issue was whether multinational auspices for reprocessing and enrichment plants should be mandatory or a matter of discretion by a supplier country.

March 26, 1975

State Department memorandum, 'Nuclear Suppliers Conference/French Participation'

This memo describes the details of the nuclear suppliers' conference, specifically the details of French participation. Cites the need for common understanding regarding nuclear exports is needed and therefore invites Great Britain, the Soviet Union, West Germany, Japan, and France to participate in the conference. Also details the process of trying to persuade France to participate and dissuading their reluctancy.

December 21, 1974

George H. Springsteen, Jr., Executive Secretary, to Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, 'Briefing Paper on Non-Proliferation'

In the course of a background paper on the nuclear proliferation problem and policy options, the State Department updated the White House on the state of play of the nuclear suppliers’ initiative: the British, the Canadians, and the Soviets had agreed to attend a meeting; the Germans would agree “if all key suppliers” (France) accepted; and the Japanese, who had also been asked, had not responded. The French had not given an answer and bilateral discussions would take place to go over the issues.

May 25, 1974

Meeting between Chairman Mao Tse-Tung [Mao Zedong] and Mr. Heath, Saturday, 25 May, 1974, approximately 1.15-2.45pm

U.K. Prime Minister Edward Heath and Chairman Mao discussed the following topics: U.S.-Soviet relations, Watergate, Chinese-U.S. relations, U.S. bases in Asia, a united Europe, Sino-Soviet relations, British-Soviet relations, and British-Chinese relations.

February 17, 1973

Memorandum of Conversation between Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Henry Kissinger

Mao Zedong and Kissinger's meeting was aimed at establishing political relations between China and the United States. They discussed the following issues: U.S.-Chinese cooperation, the differences in ideology, Western German policy towards the Soviet Union, the amount of American overseas troops, the Vietnam War, trade barriers between two nations, Chinese-Japanese relations, and the historical issues between Germany and Britain during WWII.

September 6, 1954

Australian Government Trade Commissioner, Hong Kong, to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs, 'Visit to China by the British Labour Party Delegation'

This is a report on a visit by Clement Attlee's Labor Party delegation to China in August 1954. The report covers wide ground, summarizing the delegates' experiences and views on events in China, and contains a short account of Attlee's conversation with Mao Zedong. Mao and Attlee disagreed about the Soviet Union's policy towards Eastern Europe, and Mao, after defending the Soviet record, in the end admitted that he simply did not know enough about the situation in Eastern Europe. There was also some discussion of Taiwan, though Attlee was given the impression that China would not attack Taiwan for at least 10 years. There is also an interesting quote: "The delegation... received or were confirmed in the impression that the Chinese Government was... living in a world of delusions. The state had been reached where the Central People's Government viewed the outside world not as it was but according to how they thought it should be."

August 19, 1971

Cable from Ambassador Rush to Henry Kissinger Regarding the Four Powers Negotiations on Berlin

Rush updates National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger on the progress of the Four Powers Negotiations on Berlin, informing him that the "bureaucrats [in the State Department] have been foiled" and an agreement has been completed and "it contains virtually everything we hoped to get under our maximum demands."

August 18, 1971

Cable from Ambassador Rush to Henry Kissinger on the Four Powers Negotiations on Berlin

US Ambassador Rush recommends to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger that the negotiations take a "no more than a two week recess" in agreement with the request made by Secretary of State Rogers.

August 18, 1971

Cable from Secretary Rogers to Ambassador Rush on the Four Powers Negotiations on Berlin

Alarmed by the speed of the negotiations' progress, Secretary Rogers informs Ambassador Rush (and Henry Kissinger) that "an ad referendum agreement should not be reached at the present time."

Pagination