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June 9, 1981	Memorandum for Richard V. Allen from Douglas J. Feith, ‘Israeli Raid on Iraqi Nuclear Facility’ NSC staffer Douglas J. Feith took the internal debate on the legitimacy of the raid a step further, stating that “no rebuke of Israel’s raid against Iraq should be issued without an equally emphatic rebuke of Iraq.” Feith’s argument was based on the fact that Iraq had continuously refused to acknowledge Israel’s existence and was officially at war with it.
June 9, 1981	Memorandum for Richard V. Allen from Raymond Tanter, 'Israel's Air Strike on Iraq's Nuclear Facility' The NSC’s Raymond Tanter recommended a “middle course of action,” one which would distance Washington from the strike “while avoiding extreme measures designed to punish Israel.”
June 15, 1981	Memorandum for the President [Ronald Reagan] from Walter J. Stoessel, ‘Political Strategy for Responding to Israeli Attack’ Following Lewis’ cable, and the realization that the raid should have been at least somewhat anticipated, the administration opted to develop a more restrained, sober approach towards Israel, constructing what was termed a “political strategy for responding to Israeli attack”.
June 9, 1981	Cable, American Embassy Tel Aviv to the Secretary of State, ‘Israeli Strike on Iraqi Nuclear Facility: Background for the Decision’ While starting to construct the political strategy of response to the raid, the administration came face to face with what U.S. ambassador to Israel, Sam Lewis called in his cable to Washington a “gap” in the administration’s “institutional memory”, as assessments regarding Israel’s intention to launch a strike were not passed on from the Carter administration.
June 11, 1981	Cable from Indian Embassy Baghdad to Foreign Ministry in Delhi Indian diplomats speculated at the time that the suspension of the delivery of the F-16 jets was potentially a U.S. gesture of goodwill toward Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, aimed at appeasing him and keeping the embryonic peace process with Israel alive.
June 15, 1981	Memorandum for the President [Ronald Reagan] from Richard V. Allen, ‘Political Strategy for Responding to Israeli Attack’ National Security Advisor Richard V. Allen informed Reagan that the administration was “not required to make a legal determination on whether Israel violated U.S. law” and commented that the issue of the raid was “to be treated as a political rather than a legal question.”
June 11, 1981	Memorandum for Richard V. Allen from Robert M Kimmitt, Subject: Israeli Strike -- Legal Aspects This NSC memo examines some of the legal aspects of the raid. It states that the administration should determine “[W]hether a substantial violation has occurred”, as this would reflect on the delivery of Israel’s F-16 jets.
June 7, 1981	Memorandum for Mr. Richard V. Allen from L. Paul Bremer, III, ‘NSC Discussion Paper: Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Cooperation’ On 7 June 1981, the day of the Osirak raid, a policy paper composed by the ‘Senior Interagency Group on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Cooperation’ (SIG) was submitted to the NSC. The discussion paper crowned the administration’s nonproliferation efforts as a “key foreign policy objective” and called to revise the 1978 NNPA.
December 1, 1980	Recommendation for the Reagan Administration Nonproliferation Policy Following Reagan’s election in November 1980, his transition team in charge of nuclear matters called for a clean, dramatic break from the policies of the outgoing Carter administration. As for relations with the IAEA, a vital component of the policy, the ACDA paper argued that Washington should employ the agency as an agent to achieve its nonproliferation goals. The IAEA and the NPT were to be “further strengthened and given greater U.S. support.” To reinforce U.S. influence over the agency, it was recommended that “support to the IAEA in the form of financial contribution, manpower and technical advice should be increased significantly.
April 2001	Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Newsbrief, Number 53 A compilation of the latest news, events, and publications related to nuclear weapons and nuclear non-proliferation. The “Newsbrief” was produced by the PPNN and personally edited by Ben Sanders.