Talking points for Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Hollum from the State Department. Hollum was instructed to “urge” the Japanese to convey their concern to the government of India and “strong opposition [to] any such tests.” The State Department did not want to make any public statements about the situation because that “would be counterproductive,” that is, it would tip the U.S.’s hand Japan to tell Tokyo to voice its concerns over the possible Indian Nuclear Test to New Delhi.

Telegram instructing the Charges d'Affairs to arrange an urgent meeting between the United States Ambassador to India and the Indian Prime Minister's Pricipal Secretary to discuss American concerns that India will launch a nuclear test. The State Department was ready for a demarche to the Indian government to express “grave concerns” about the possibility of a test.

A memorandum from Hugh Montgomery, The Director of Intelligence and Research at the State Department to Ambassador Ronald Spiers discussing Indian and Pakistani nuclear proliferation. The Director details tensions between Pakistan and India, potential actions by India to stop a Pakistani nuclear program, and the influence of outside actors such as the USSR, China, and the United States.

A State Department assessment of Pakistan’s security situation, its nuclear program and the future of Pakistani planning. A range of subjects are covered in depth including, Pakistan’s perception of its security situation, major foreign policy dilemmas such as India and Afghanistan, the development of a “nuclear options” and American non-proliferation responses.

Just a few months into President Reagan’s first term his administration wanted to make its own mark on nonproliferation policy. The report suggests building “broader bilateral relationship[s]” and offering political and security incentives could persuade states considering developing nuclear weapons to cease these efforts.

A series of letters between Dr. Bhabha and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru covering a wide range of subjects, including the appropriate venues to voice opinions, the status of the Colaba site, meeting with the Pakistan Association for the Advancement of Science, and issues with coordination between the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Ministry of Education on scientific research and education. Also includes a copy of a letter from The Tokyo Shimbun requesting Dr. Bhabha’s presence at a forum discussing the justifiability of American hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacific.

A letter from S.S. Bhatnagar to Dr. Bhabha via the Indian Embassy in Washington D.C. apprising him of a visit with to the Atomic Energy Commission as well as providing an update on the acquisition of needed minerals.

The interagency group prepared a response to NSSM 156 on 1 September 1972 and it was sent to Kissinger. The summary of the study reproduced here includes the conclusion that an Indian test would be “a set-back to nonproliferation efforts” and that Washington should “do what [it] can to avert or delay” one. Thus, recommendations included a number of unilateral and multilateral actions that the United States government could take, noting that “given the poor state” of Indo-American relations, an “overly visible” U.S. effort would more likely speed up an Indian decision to test a device, Even non-US efforts were likely not to “be per se effective.”

U.S. State Department reports that U.S. officials have instructions not to share U.S. "concerns" with India over Pakistan's nuclear program.

U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan advises against informing the Indian government about U.S. concerns over Pakistan's nuclear program. It would have an "adverse impact" for the U.S. government to be seen colluding with India by Pakistan.