Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) news wire dispatch. The United Press International Agency reported on the sides' softened stances in negotiation and U Thant's role in the inspection issue.

U Thant expressed his consent at the Soviet effort to resolve the Cuban crisis and informed Khrushchev of his upcoming visit to Cuba. U Thant said that he was happy to know that the USSR had sent Mr. Kuznetsov to New York to work with him. Prospect of UN monitors in Cuba was also mentioned.

Khrushchev informed Castro of his deal with J.F.Kennedy. The Soviet leader warned Castro of attempts to sabotage the agreement by men in the Pentagon and urged him to restrain from being provoked, e.g. firing at American planes.

Fidel Castro explained to Khrushchev his decision to shoot down American planes operating in Cuban air space and reaffirmed his opposition to any inspection of Cuban territory.

Bertrand Russell expressed his admiration for the manner in which Khrushchev dealt with the Cuban Missile Crisis.

In his message to Khrushchev, Fidel Castro evaluated the two possible scenarios of American aggression against Cuba. Castro seems to suggest a retaliatory nuclear strike against the US in the case of an attack on Cuba.

The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs relayed a message from U Thant: The delegates of a large number of countries urged the involved parties to restrain from any actions that can exacerbate the situation. They also called for a voluntary suspension of quarantines for the inspection of ships bound for Cuba.

The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered its ambassadors to visit the local ministers of foreign affairs and inform them of the declaration of the USSR on the situation in Cuba and its decision to bring the American violation of the UN charter before the UN.

Kuznetsov relays the results of a conversation between Mikoyan and U Thant. The bulk of the conversation between the two concerns U Thant’s recent visit to Cuba and his conversation with Castro. Mikoyan stresses lifting the quarantine around Cuba.

In March 1953, Moscow had declined Ulbricht’s request for tightening up the sector border in Berlin, then the major loophole in the SED leadership’s efforts to seal off East Germany. In the aftermath of the demonstrations and unrest in Berlin, the SED leadership apparently tried to reintroduce the idea of increased “border security” in Berlin. Eager to salvage whatever was left of its political position as a champion of German unity, Moscow again held such measures as politically “disadvantageous” and “unacceptable.” Certainly, the Kremlin was also aware of the continued widespread resentment among the Berlin and GDR population which made any more restrictive measures a risky undertaking. Instead, the Soviets urged the SED to increase its “fight against hostile elements” in West Berlin—an issue that would become more and more the focus of Soviet attitude on Berlin.