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November 11, 1955

Record of Conversation between N. A. Bulganin, N. S. Khrushchev and A. I. Mikoyan with Norwegian Prime Minister E. Gerhardsen and Minister of Trade A. Skaug on 11 November 1955

Gerhardsen and Skaug discuss trade between the USSR and Norway; control of the border river Pasvikelv (Paatso-Ioki) and the mutual exploitation of its hydro-energy resources; Norwegians citizens located in the Soviet Union, and Soviet-Norwegian cultural ties.

November 22, 1956

Memorandum of Conversation with Bak Uiwan on 22 November 1956

Discussion with Bak Uiwan, who notes that the KWP's atmosphere is still tense following the August Plenum. Uiwan claimed Kim Il Sung agreed with the suggestions of the Sino-Soviet delegation (Mikoyan and Dehuai) in order to avoid tension in the meeting, but had no intention of following through.

November 25, 1963

Top Secret Cipher Telegram from Anastas Mikoyan to CPSU Central Committee

Mikoyan reports his recent conversations with US officials following JFK’s assassination. He reports that it is likely that Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon Johnson, will likely maintain Kennedy’s policy on US-Soviet foreign relations. US Ambassador Thompson also talks to Mikoyan about US concerns about the Soviet press coverage of the assassination.

November 6, 1962

Ciphered Telegram from Anastas Mikoyan to CC CPSU

Mikoyan reports to the CC CPSU regarding his conversations with the Cuban leadership. Fide Castrol had concerns about the possible withdraw of all Soviet weapons and all military specialists from Cuba and the possibility of UN inspections on Cuban territory.

January 31, 1949

Notes by Anastas Mikoyan ahead of Meetings with Mao Zedong

Notes taken by Minister of Foreign Trade Anastas Mikoyan during a meeting with Mao Zedong in Beijing. They discuss relations with the United States and other Western powers and the nationalization of foreign-owned factories in China. Mikoyan also gave advice on developing the new Communist government in China. Noteably, Mikoyan wrote that "the path of the regime of the people’s democracies, or the path of the Russian Soviet revolution, is not quite appropriate for China. China has its own path of development."

November 16, 1962

Record of Conversation between Mikoyan and Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, Havana, 16 November 1962

The conversation takes place soon after the IL-28 crisis, which gives Mikoyan a chance to patch up the relationship with trade agreements and promises of future aid and industrial cooperation. Near the end of the conversation, Guevara and Mikoyan discuss the theory of revolutionary struggle. Guevara shares his vision that “further development of the revolutions in Latin America must follow the line of simultaneous explosions in all countries.” Mikoyan cautions him, pointing to the Soviet experience and using the metaphor of the rebellion on the battleship “Potemkin.” Hinting at further disagreement ahead, he gently registers his disagreement with the Cuban leader’s drive to ignite revolution in the hemisphere.

November 13, 1962

Record of Conversation between Mikoyan and Fidel Castro, Havana

The conversation was recorded after the Cuban leader refused to see the Soviet envoy for three days in a reaction to the new demand. Castro starts by declaring his disagreement with the decision to remove the IL-28s but, assures Mikoyan that the revolutionary leadership discussed the issue and agreed to the removal. Mikoyan presents all his arguments to show that the withdrawal of the planes would end the crisis and make the US non-invasion pledge more credible. He acknowledges the “negative psychological effect” of the decision and reiterates that all the rest of the weapons would stay in Cuba so its security would be guaranteed without the obsolete planes. They also agree on the rules of verification of the withdrawal.

November 11, 1962

Telegram from Nikita Khrushchev to Anastas Mikoyan

This telegram, written in Khrushchev's stream-of-consciousness style, outlines the rationale behind the decision to remove the missiles from Cuba that caused the crisis: It was much better to end the crisis by giving up planes that were already obsolete—to show that the Soviet Union and Cuba had fulfilled all the promises Khrushchev had given Kennedy—and consequently to expect, and demand, full compliance with the non-invasion pledge on the part of the United States, than to retain the planes and give the Americans a justification to violate their pledge. The telegram also spells out, in Khrushchev’s words, of the reasons why the weapons were deployed to Cuba in the first place.

July 12, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 41

Protocol 41 details a meeting on a group of economic advisers sent to Cuba from the Soviet Union.

February 1, 1949

Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Zhou Enlai

Anastas Mikoyan and Zhou Enlai discuss Chinese Communist Party contacts with the US, recognition of the coalition government, and the Chinese attitude toward foreign property.

Pagination