The Soviet leadership discusses the state of Soviet foreign policy after the Hungarian crisis and Khrushchev’s visit to the US. Molotov criticizes Khrushchev for recklessness in foreign policy direction. Soviet inroads in the Middle East and the Third World are analyzed. The effects of the crises in Eastern Europe are placed in the context of the struggle against US imperialism.

Memorandum of Conversation between P.F. Iudin and Deng Xiaoping. Iudin and Xiaoping discussed the letter from the CC of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia [UCY] to the CC CPSU. Deng expressed his support for the CC CPSU decisions regarding the Yugoslav affairs, showed no objections to the CC UCY's program, and favored the Yugoslavs in their development of Marxist thought.

This resolution instructs the Soviet Ambassador to Belgrade to transmit a letter to Tito requesting a secret meeting on November 1 or 2 with Khrushchev and Malenkov. It also empowers certain members to conduct negotiations with the United Workers Party of Poland.

In this coded telegram, the Soviet Ministry is informed of Imre Nagy’s location at the Yugolsav embassy in Budapest. Firiubin reports that the Yugoslavs are attempting to obtain a statement from Nagy in support of Kadar’s new government. Tito is noted as requesting that the Soviet government not repress communists who ‘did not immediately take the correct line’ during the uprising and that the Soviet government protect the Yugoslav embassy from potential attack.

In his diary, Shepilov pledges to investigate the circumstances surrounding tank fire near the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest. Promises are made to investigate the story and report back to Yugoslavian officials. Shepilov notes that Yugoslavian Ambassador Micunovic agrees with judgments made about Nagy. Shepilov expresses consternation at how Yugoslavia can provide refuge for Nagy and condemn him. References to a meeting in Brioni between Khrushchev, Malenkov and Tito detail the opinions of Yugoslav and Soviet officials concerning Nagy.

In this letter, the Central Committee of Yugoslavia responds to the CC CPSU over questions concerning Yugoslavia’s decision to provide shelter to Nagy and his group at their embassy. The letter begins by expressing agreement on the weakness of Nagy’s government, the need to form a new government under Kadar, and the existence of “honest communists” in Nagy’s government that could assist Kadar. The letter relates that Yugoslavia cannot hand Nagy and his group over to authorities because of the domestic consequences of such an action. The correspondence ends with both the suggestion of amnesty for Nagy and Yugoslavia’s disavowal of any connection to Nagy or the uprising.

Memorandum of conversation between Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and Yugoslav Ambassador Vidic. Topics of discussion include Austrian-Yugoslav relations, and the current state of relations with the Soviet Union. This memorandum was written one year after the Tito-Stalin split, and the founding of Titoism.

Raul Castro discusses with the Soviet Ambassador in Cuba the position to be adopted by the Cuban and Soviet governments with regard to the presence of Soviet soldiers in Cuba. Raul Castro also informs the Soviet Ambassador of the discussions that took place between Fidel Castro and Josip Tito in Havana during the meeting of the non-aligned countries.

This folder consists of a detailed operational plan for cooperation between the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB for the years 1975-1978. Specific objectives include penetrating the military, political, and economic establishments of the United States, Britain, West Germany, France, and NATO, impeding the activities of the Czech Congress of National Development (KNR), collecting information on “Zionist intrigues,” gathering scientific/technical information on Western achievements in the fields of biological, chemical, and thermonuclear weapons, and using active measures to curtail the activities of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in West Germany.