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Documents

July 11, 1948

Record of Conversation between Kim Gu and Liu Yuwan

Kim Gu (Kim Koo) and the Chinese Nationalist Minister Liu Yuwan discuss Kim's participation in the South Korean government, his attendance at a conference in Pyongyang, and the possibility of a Russian-led attack on southern Korea.

August 3, 1953

Confidential Memorandum, Before Agreeing to the Armistice Agreement

When the United States agreed to a truce talk to end the Korea War, President Syngman Rhee disapproved. He opposed the truce and tried to attack these peace proceedings through a serious of events- such as releasing thousands of prisoners of war and creating turmoil for the US government. In order to persuade Rhee to accept the armistice defense, the US dispatches Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson to meet with the South Korean president in a series of bargaining discussions. Eventually, under certain conditions and a mutual defense pact with the US, Rhee agrees to the armistice.

August 14, 1953

Memorandum, President Syngman Rhee to All Diplomatic Officials

Following the ratification of the Armistice Agreement and the Mutual Defense Treaty, President Rhee conveys that he expects the Armistice to fail because the communists will “undoubtedly” violate it and undermine Korean independence. Rhee wants to renew war to secure victory but most importantly to strengthen the ROK-U.S alliance. Following the memorandum he makes twelve points ranging from topic like Korean rehabilitation to prisoners of war from the Korean War.

May 4, 1953

Letter, General Duk Shin Choi to General William K. Harrison, Jr. on Civilian Internees

From April 20 to May 3 1953, Operation Little Switch allowed the exchange of the sick and wounded prisoners of wars between the United Nations, North Korea, and China. In this letter, Major General Choi informs General Harrison that the communist have failed to return hundreds of U.N. POWs because of their broad interpretation of the agreement. General Choi provides a series of steps to improve this agreement but most importantly he urges that the terms “civilian internees” and “displaced person” should be clarified in the Draft Armistice Agreement.

1953

Rules of Procedures Governing Explanations and Interviews by Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission

In 1953 the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission was created in order to deal with the repatriation of thousands of prisoners of war. For those POWs who wished to not to repatriate, a series of explanations and interviews were held in order to allow them to choose their side in a neutral setting. This is a list of the general provisions of the commission which clarifies and explains who, how, and where these interviews would be held.

1954

Freedom to Non-Repatriated Prisoners of War

This note warns that the communists will try to convince the world that these “freed” prisoners are not really freed and during this processing and resettlement period the world will be watching the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China's actions.

1954

The POW Scandal in Korea

According to A.B Carey, one of the lessons learned from fighting the Kremlin and its “communism” ideology is evidently seen amongst the Korean and Chinese prisoners of war. Both groups of POW not only disapprove of the communism but would also actively fight against it if they had the opportunity. Carey uses ten ideas which denounce the Kremlin as the one responsible for the lies and bellicosities during the Cold War. He also proceeds to demonstrate ways the free world can defeat this communist caucus.

February 9, 1951

Letter, General John B. Coulter to President Syngman Rhee

General writes to President Rhee on the subject of prisoners of war. He states that he has written to EUSAK and is awaiting new instructions to arrive.

May 3, 1951

Letter, President Syngman Rhee to General Coulter

President Rhee writes to General Coulter to address the issue of prisoners of war. After stating that releasing POWs would “demoralize” Korean soldiers, Rhee expresses his concern for POWs forced to fight in the North’s side. Rhee states that “democratic-accepting” POWs can be released only after they pass a series of tests proving them to be anti-communist. Once released, these POWs can “carry their stories of fair treatment under a democratic United Nations.”

Pagination