In September 1977, W. Jaruzelski  visited Mongolia and the DPRK. While in North Korea, Jaruzelski met with President Kim Il Sung and the Minister of National Defense O Jin U.  Although Jaruzelski did make several critical comments about the DPRK in his secret post-trip report, he still spoke in highly favorable terms about the country and generally recommended that Poland strengthen its relations with North Korea. 

Jaruzelsk's report also includes commentary on China's relations with both Mongolia and the DPRK.

Shtykov recounts a recent meeting between Kim Il and Mao Zedong.

In agreement with the Chinese comrades, Korean reserves are to be withdrawn to Manchuria, including nine infantry divisions, and officers school, a tank regiment-in-training, and an air division with an aviation regiment-in-training. Six combat divisions will be preparing in Korea.

Telegram instructing Ambassador Razuvaev to discuss with Kim Il Sung details for reorganizing the KPA administrative and command structure.

Telegram from Amb. Rauvaev to Stalin reporting on the changes planned in the structure of the KPA, per Stalin's telegram of 30 January

Reply from Stalin to Shtykov's telegram of July 1, 1950. Requests additional information on KPA plans and reaction to American internvention. Informs of intent to meet requests by Kim Il Sung for additional war materiel.

Telegram from Shtykov to Stalin (copied to the Soviet leadership) relaying a request from Kim Il Sung for military advisors.

Stalin clarifies that his previous telegram of 30 January was not an order, but a proposal to discuss options with Korea.

Stalin sends a message for Kim Il Sung saying that he cannot give Kim Il Sung rifle-mortar arms, but can give him other types of ammunition.

Matveyev describes the state of the Korean People’s Army, particularly the severe status of troops in Seoul and Busan after having encountered American air and ground forces. Matveyev also reports on a meeting between several Soviet and Korean foreign ministers in which Kim Il Sung assumed the tasks of both Supreme Commander-in-Chief and Defense Minister and ordered the deployment of troops northward. Matveyev also outlines the steps he plans to take as a Soviet envoy in aiding the desperate Korean army.