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Documents

February 13, 1965

Cable from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade, 'Reporting the Situation of the Talks between the Premier and Kosygin concerning Trade'

The Ministry of Foreign Trade summarizes the trade issues discussed by Zhou Enlai and Kosygin.

February 6, 1965

Record of the First Contact between Premier Zhou and Vice Premier Chen Yi and Kosygin

Premier Zhou and others meet to discuss the current situations in South Vietnam and Laos, U.S. and Soviet strategy, and Chinese-Soviet competition over civil aviation, among other pressing issues.

February 10, 1965

Record of the Fifth Contact between Premier Zhou and Vice Premier Chen Yi and Kosygin (1)

Zhou and Kosygin discussed the conflicts in Vietnam. They discussed in details of providing logistic and political supports to North Vietnam.

March 31, 1965

Record of the Second Meeting between Premier Zhou and President Ben Bella

Ben Bella and Zhou Enlai discuss a range of issues, including the Vietnam War, the Sino-Soviet split, the Second Asian-African Conference, China's status at the UN, Algerian foreign policy, and developments in the Congo and elsewhere in Africa.

1965

Lê Thanh Nghị, 'Report on Meetings with Party Leaders of Eight Socialist Countries'

North Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Politburo member Le Thanh Nghi recounts his discussions with socialist leaders in the summer of 1965, just as the war in the south was heating up.

February 16, 1967

Note Prepared by First Secretary (Political) on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

This note states that Kosygin thinks non-proliferation is not a method of fixing a special status for the present nuclear powers, but it is an important stage in the struggle for nuclear disarmament.

October 5, 1966

Transcript of Discussions with Representatives of the Chinese People’s Republic and The Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the Return of the Romanian Delegation from Vietnam (Moscow)

This document is a transcript of a conversation between A. N. Kosygin and I. Gh. Maurer regarding the visit of the Romanian delegation to Vietnam and then China that discusses the suggestion that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam begin negotiations simultaneously while fighting, which both the Chinese and Vietnamese rejected, and the proposal that the socialist countries of the world communicate their policies toward Vietnam with each other, which the Vietnamese favored, but the Chinese rejected.

May 26, 1966

Report from the Hungarian Embassy in Cario on Kosygin's visit in the UAR

This report describes the visit of Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin to the United Arab Republic (UAR) during which he reinforced positive relations with President Nasser and the UAR and discussed the Vietnam War, Sino-Soviet tensions, the Arab World, Israel, and economic concerns.

April 3, 1979

Information about the Results of the Official Friendly Visit of A.N. Kosygin in India (March 9-15 of This Year)

This document reports on the visit by the Soviet premier, Alexsei Kosygin, to India in March 1979. The Indian leadership once again confirms its intention to retain close relations with Moscow irrespective of the future relationship with the US and China. During the visit a number of trade and scientific agreements are signed. The USSR expresses its readiness to cooperate in the nuclear field on the basis of peaceful use as laid down in the Indian-Soviet agreement of January 1979. Reacting to the Chinese threat and its perceived objective to gain a hegemonic position in Asia, India wishes to talk about the delivery of more sophisticated military equipment. The Soviet officials interpret Indian foreign policy as moving closer to the Socialist Bloc and joining Vietnam and Cuba in the formation of a ‘leftist wing’ in the Non-Aligned Movement.

April 25, 1963

Minutes of CC CPSU Presidium Meeting on Restricting Soviet Shortwave Receivers

A discussion among the top leadership of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the problem of limiting production shortwave radio sets that receive Western broadcasts. The argument is made that, if sets capable of receiving Western radio broadcasts are not produced, Soviet citizens will find ways of adapting non-shortwave radios to receive the broadcasts. The Soviet leaders seem to be under the misconception that the production of shortwave receivers in America was stopped so that Americans couldn’t receive information from the USSR and that the Soviets should do likewise.

Pagination