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Documents

July 30, 1971

Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan

The ROK government is anxious about the Nixon-Zhou Enlai meeting.Their anxiety stems from the US military disengagement in the ROK, Zhou's four-point program, and the potential for communist China to sway UN votes on the Korean question.

July 23, 1971

Letter, UNCURK Principal Secretary Kuzbari to UN Chef de Cabinet Narasimhan

Kuzbari reports that Nixon's visit to Beijing and shift in power in East Asia creates instability for ROK government.

August 6, 1971

Letter of Enver Hoxha, Central Committee of the Party of Labor of Albania, to Mao Zedong, Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

In a letter to Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Enver Hoxha wrote, on behalf of the Labor Party of Albandia, about Albania's position regarding President Nixon's upcoming visit to China. Albania did not approve nor support this visit due to American imperialism and U.S. protests against Marxism-Lenninism.

March 10, 1970

Memorandum for President Nixon from Kissinger, "The Current Status of Brandt's Ostpolitik"

A memorandum for President Nixon from National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger on the current status of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's "Ostpolitik" or Eastern Policy, which sought to normalize relations between West Germany and the communist countries.

February 16, 1970

Memorandum for President Nixon from Kissinger, "Brandt's Eastern Policy"

A memorandum for President Nixon from National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger summarizing West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's "Ostpolitik" or Eastern Policy, which sought to normalize relations between West Germany and the communist countries.

July 12, 1969

Memorandum of conversation of the Ambassador of the USSR A.F. Dobrynin with Kissinger

In this July 1969 report to the Politburo, Soviet ambassador to Washington Anatoly Dobrynin recounts a wide-ranging conversation with national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger a half-year into President Richard M. Nixon’s first term. Dobrynin also offers his candid personal evaluation of Kissinger and the secret White House “backchannel” established by Nixon to circumvent the State Department and communicate directly with the Soviet leadership.

August 2, 1971

Record of the Meeting Between Leonid Brezhnev and East European Party Leaders in the Crimea (Including Discussion on China)

This record of the Crimean meeting between General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev of the Soviet Communist Party and East European party leaders addresses Soviet domestic and foreign policies. Also discussed is China's anti-Soviet attitude. Brezhnev mentions the negative reactions of Korea and Vietnam to US President Richard Nixon's planned visit to China. The participants at the meeting are in favor of intensifying relations with Japan. Further discussions focus on the possibility of China joining the UN. All participants at the meeting criticize Nicolae Ceauşescu's visit to China as damaging the interests of the Warsaw Pact. Romania is said to support China's politics towards Albania and Yugoslavia.

July 4, 1972

Henry Kissinger to President Nixon, 'Proposed NSSM on the Implications of an Indian Nuclear Test,' with cover memorandum from Richard T. Kennedy

National security assistant Henry Kissinger asks President Nixon to approve a proposal for a national security study memorandum [NSSM] on the implications of an Indian nuclear test for U.S. interests.

April 22, 1969

Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to William P. Rogers, US-French Military Relations

This is a follow up of a memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon that was sent on April 15, 1969, where Nixon approved Kissinger to tell the Secretary of State the same points that were discussed in the original memorandum. Such points were that Kissinger has told Healey, British Defense Minister, that the French have not approached the U.S. for military assistance, and that any decision to aid France would have to be heavily weighed beforehand. The necessity for secrecy on these topics is stressed by Kissinger.

March 29, 1971

National Security Decision Memorandum 103, 'Military Cooperation with France'

Outlines President Nixon's decisions regarding France's request for military aid with their nuclear program. The restrictions on exporting advanced computers will be loosened, allowing France to import more powerful models. Limited technical assistance for their ballistic missile program will be offered, but only in areas that won't jeopardize US security or "provide France with a distinct new capability."

Pagination