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Documents

July 13, 1950

Cable No. 3355, Filippov [Stalin] to the Soviet Ambassador, Peking

Stalin tells Mao that the British have been pressuring the Soviets to help for the North Koreans to withdraw to the 38th peril, and the Soviets are offended by this, and to want to insist on Soviet and PRC participation in the Security Council to resolve the issue. He also informs Mao of his willingness to send more planes, and more pilots to help train Chinese forces.

July 27, 1951

From the Diary of N. V. Roshchin: Memorandum of Conversation with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai on 24 July 1951

Discussion between Soviet Ambassador to the PRC Roshchin and Zhou Enlai regarding the conflict in Korea. Zhou states that the war effort is a drain on China's domestic economy, but that it will bounce back once the war is won. Also describes Chinese relations with capitalist countries. Notes that the CCP lacks technical specialists of any sort.

January 13, 1951

Ciphered telegram, Roshchin to USSR Foreign Ministry

Message to Stalin from Roshchin informing him of the Chinese receipt of one of his earlier telegrams and informing him of an invitation to Beijing to Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai from Mao.

December 7, 1950

Ciphered telegram, Gromyko to Roshchin Transmitting Message from Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai

Message from Stalin to Zhou Enlai agreeing with Chinese conditions for a ceasefire and advising that the Chinese limit negotiations on a ceasefire until Seoul is liberated.

July 5, 1950

Ciphered Telegram No. 3172, Stalin to Zhou Enlai via Roshchin

A telegram from Stalin to Zhou Enlai with regards to India's mediation in the PRC's entry into the UN, Chinese troop movements in preparation for a possible Southern/Allied counterattack, and Soviet planes flying over Manchuria.

July 13, 1950

Ciphered telegram, Filippov [Stalin] to Zhou Enlai or Mao Zedong (via Roshchin)

Telegram from Stalin to Mao and Zhou Enlai detailing his response to the English protest concerning "the Korean question." Also, a request for confirmation of Chinese troop movements to the Sino-Korea border, in case of a repulse of North Korean forces. Finally, a confirmation of the plans to train Chinese pilots on Soviet jets, to be followed by the transfer of the jets to Chinese possession.