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October 29, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Foreign Ministry to Yugoslav Embassies in Havana and Washington and Yugoslav Mission to the United Nations

Brazilian President João Goulart emphasizes that the possibility of an adequate solution (to the Cuban Missile Crisis) could be increased if there were measures to suspend the quarantine (blockade) immediately, followed by corresponding and effective stoppage of weapons shipment to Cuba as well as determining obligations to prevent the spreading of nuclear weapons and the installation of bases. In his opinion the danger of war could increase significantly and worries of Brazil would grow as far as its own security was concerned, if such bases were installed in Cuba or any other part of LA. He also brought to the attention the proposal of Brazil in the UN for the denuclearization of Latin America.

October 28, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

Foreign Minister Raúl Roa said to the Yugoslavian official that Fidel’s last declaration (his 5 point statement on 28 October) was directed more at Khrushchev than to Kennedy.

October 28, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

Barišić is forwarding a message from Brazilian President João Goulart to Yugoslavian President Tito. The body of the message contains his thoughts on both Brazil and Yugoslavia's involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis and also his hopes that negotiations can reach a settlement that will both retain Cuba's right to self-determination and also proceed with the denuclearization efforts of Latin America.

October 27, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry about a meeting with Brazilian President João Goulart. Barišić says Goulart considers that everything must be done to prevent the beginning of war, because war would bring unpredictable catastrophe and it would be hard to extinguish it if war operations start. Goulart also shares his opinion that negotiations are necessary, and that Cuba must be prevented from becoming an atomic base for it could be the constant cause of war dangers.

October 25, 1962

Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry

A telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry describing Vidaković's meeting with Brazilian Ambassador Pinto. They mostly discussed the Cuban crisis in relation to decisions made in the Organization of American States (OAS) councils.

November 1, 1962

Telegram from Israeli Embassy in Havana (Prato), to Israeli Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem

Prato and Pinto discuss Brazilian efforts to pursuade Cuba to accept inspectors as well as what a potential U.S. attack would mean for diplomatic relations in the region.

October 29, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 11:30 p.m., Monday

Pinto transmit a message from President Goulart's personal envoy, General Albino Silva, describing a meeting with Fidel Castro, mostly discussing US evacuation of Guantanamo and the UN inspections of bases on Cuban territory.

October 26, 1962

Letter from Yugoslav President Tito to Brazilian President Goulart

Yugoslav President Tito is writing to Brazilian President Goulart discussing concerns over the situation in Cuba. In Tito's opinion, the best course of action is for direct negotiations to continue in the UN.

October 31, 1962

Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba, 'A Cuban Leader Talked about the Situation'

A report from a conversation with Joaquín Ordoqui. Two major topics are discussed. First: The Brazilian president, Joâo Goulart, sent his aide, Gen. Albino da Silva to Cuba, indicating that the Brazilian government is willing to mediate in the hopes of solving the Cuban problem, that the US is also willing to maintain relations with Cuba, and that [the Brazilian government] wants Cuba to return to the Organization of American States. And second: When negotiating with [UN Secretary-General] U Thant, we made Cuba's position crystal clear. Fidel [Castro] told him [U Thant] that an inspection, regardless of its form, would not be approved [by Cuban leaders], nor would it be approved by the Cuban people.

Pagination