The Council re-caps the current situation in the Middle East and discusses US options to improve the American position in the Middle East and work for an Arab-Israeli settlement.

The paper provides an overview of American policy in the Middle East, including main interests and their importance, the Soviet Union's influence in the Middle East, and threats to NATO.

Romanian embassy in London reporting that the United States has not given its opinion on the Palestinian question and is waiting for the UN to have further discussions.

Kissinger provides Nixon with an overview of achieving a general political settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and different international frameworks for this goal.

French influence could be useful for the Arab cause, especially against Jews, based on its record of aid and nonintervention.

A detailed analysis of Israel's founding and the history of East German foreign policy toward Israel and the Arab states. Vehemently attacking Israel, and emphasizing the close relations between West Germany and Israel, was considered essential to capture the interest of Arab audiences, steering them towards closer relations with the GDR.

Nicolae Ceaușescu received Iranian Ambassador to Romania, Soltan Hossein Vakili Sanandaji, and they discussed developments in the Near East, specifically the ongoing conflict between Israel and Arab states. Ceaușescu suggested to the Ambassador that Iran should use its influence in the area to encourage other Arab states to seek a peaceful and realistic resolution to the conflict.

Notes on a meeting in Moscow from March 6-10 between Yasser Arafat & the PLO Delegation and the Soviet government. Arafat was met by Brezhnev, Boris Ponomarev and Andrei Gromyko. Among the issues discussed were the situation in the Middle East, the Soviets desire for Palestine to counter Egypt's "capitulation" to Israel and the U.S. (which Arafat affirmed), tensions in Southern Lebanon and the PLO's increasing desire to further cooperation with Syria and non-Christian Lebanese groups.

Information on the results of an analysis of the activities of the KGB residency in Cairo, Egypt from 1972-1976, conducted by KGB Service R. Starting in January 1973, the KGB leadership prohibited the residency from using Egyptian citizens as agents; however the resident in Cairo initiated restrictions on penetration operations earlier, in 1967 and 1968. As a result, by 1977, the residency had no agents in the majority of its intelligence objectives.

In May 1971, after the defeat of the anti-Sadat opposition group “left Nasserists,” the KGB’s leadership role in the organization came to light. In response, President Sadat took steps to curtail the activities of Soviet intelligence in Egypt. The KGB resident in Cairo was forced to strengthen his efforts to obtain information on the intentions of the Egyptian leadership, while improving security for clandestine operations. In 1967, the Centre decided not to task the Cairo residency with collecting information on the United States or China, because its limited resources permitted it to focus only on Egypt’s internal politics, and its relations with the USSR, the United States, Israel, and other Arab states. The prohibition against using Egyptian citizens as agents meant that the residency often had to rely on operational-technical means of collection; however by June 1977, the KGB’s leaders instructed the Cairo resident to select and recruit a well-known Soviet-Arab for use in gathering political information, and active measures.

The agenda of the Bogor Conference was to determine the purposes, timing, and participants of the Asian-African Conference. The five Southeast Asian countries agreed that China and Japan should participate in the Asian-African Conference, but some countries also insisted on the participation of US allies such as Thailand and the Philippines.