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Documents

April 27, 1961

Message by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate General for Political Affairs and Security (DGAP), 'NATO strategy. Conversation between our Ambassador in London and Lord Home'

Letter recounting a meeting between the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the British Foreign Secretary regarding NATO’s weapons development. Nuclear weapons should never be employed unless absolutely necessary and instead serve as an intimidation tactic to deter Soviet aggression. The necessity of increasing NATO’s arsenal of conventional weapons to match that of the Soviets was also stressed.

April 8, 1961

Memorandum by the Aeronautical Attaché and the Military Attaché in Washington, 'USA. President Kennedy's message to Congress on the Defense budget 1961-1962'

Description of NATO’s new directives for the 1961-1962 year, as they were presented by President Kennedy. NATO has decided on a comprehensive defense strategy which includes increasing the nuclear capabilities of submarines, airplanes, and long-range missiles while developing new non-nuclear weapons.

April 1, 1961

Memorandum by Admiral Corrado Tagliamonte to the Minister of Defense, 'American attitude toward NATO. President Kennedy's declarations'

Report submitted to the Italian Minister of Defense regarding President Kennedy’s opinion that NATO should not construct a special nuclear force since the US has already developed a nuclear deterrent. According to the Kennedy, the creation of an additional deterrent would be useless and a waste of resources.

March 22, 1961

Message by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate General for Political Affairs and Security (DGAP), 'American attitude toward NATO -
German opinions'

Letter expressing Germany’s opinion that the defense of Europe is impossible without using nuclear weapons as an intimidation tactic and horror at the United States’ suggestion that Europe can defend itself with conventional weapons alone. Defense of Germany should be NATO’s top priority because if Germany falls, the rest of Europe falls. The letter also references NATO’s difficulty in developing a cohesive strategy because each country is too concerned with protecting its own territories and assets.

March 8, 1961

Note Assessing Italian Strategic Vulnerability

Evaluation of vulnerability to Soviet aggression due to Italy’s geographic location (the middle of the Mediterranean Ocean) and political position (mostly communist). Reporting on the decision to increase nuclear weapons as well as bolster the air force in order to protect Italy and surrounding Mediterranean countries, which becomes essential considering the Soviet Union has made open threats directed at Europe and NATO.

June 17, 1961

Memorandum by General Staff of Defense (SMD), 'Atlantic Alliance's strategy - National military way of thinking'

Summary of NATO’s nuclear defense strategy, stressing the importance of utilizing both conventional and nuclear weapons and refraining from using more nuclear power than is absolutely necessary to combat Soviet aggression.

June 14, 1961

Report by Permanent Representative to NATO Alessandrini to Minister of Foreign Affairs Segni

Report on the imbalance between nuclear and conventional weapons in NATO’s defense program. The Allied powers have reduced their production of planes and ships in favor of nuclear weapons development, which worries Alessandrini because conventional weapons have not decreased in importance since the start of the Cold War.

May 30, 1961

Memorandum by Chief of Defense Staff Aldo Rossi to Minister of Defense Andreotti, 'NATO new strategic approach'

Rossi describes the recent trend of the US Administration to want to turn away from the doctrine of Massive Retaliation, towards the acquisition of a new strategic concept that includes an increase in the "nuclear threshold." In order for Italy to continue to lead the defense of central and southeastern Europe against the Soviet Union as well as address its internal social and political crises, the United States must provide Italy with financial assistance.

May 15, 1961

Message by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate General for Political Affairs and Security (DGAP), 'Conversation Brosio-Acheson. NATO's nuclear weapons'

Report on the United States’ development of nuclear weapons plans without consulting other NATO members and an analysis of the tensions between the United States (particularly Acheson and Herter) and Western Europe in regards to who should lead the nuclear weapons program.

December 21, 1960

Report to Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonio Segni

Praise for Paul-Henri Spaak in helping NATO unify Western Europe and integrate the Allied states’ economic, political, and military objectives in their ongoing struggle against the Soviet Union.

Pagination