A Chinese Communist Party digest summarizing recent meetings held between Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Peng Zhen and foreign counterparts.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 10 August 1989 describes the latest developments in Israel, Lebanon, Iran, Panama, the Soviet Union, China, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, South Korea, and West Germany.

Brezhnev discusses negotiations with the United States over the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

With a nuclear nonproliferation treaty under consideration in Washington, INR considered which countries were likely to sign on and why or why not. INR analysts, mistakenly as it turned out, believed it unlikely that the Soviet Union would be a co-sponsor of a treaty in part because of the “international climate” and also because Moscow and Washington differed on whether a treaty would recognize a “group capability.”

This lengthy report was State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research's contribution to the first National Intelligence Estimate on the nuclear proliferation, NIE 100-6-57. Written at a time when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were the only nuclear weapons states, the “Fourth Country” problem referred to the probability that some unspecified country, whether France or China, was likely to be the next nuclear weapons state. Enclosed with letter from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Division of Research for USSR and Western Europe, to Roger Mateson, 4 June 1957, Secret

Description of Federal Chancellor Kiesinger's visit to India, summarizing the issues he discusses with Indira Ghandi during his stay there. First, Kiesinger explains the position of West Germany regarding the Vietnam War, issues in the Middle East, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and German trade with China. Indira Gandhi then raises a number of issues, including German-Indian relations, India's conflicts with Pakistan and China, India's current domestic problems, and a concluding hope that West Germany and India can deepen relations.

This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.

This US analysis of the likelihood of nuclear proliferation during the next decade was finished only days after the first Chinese nuclear test on 16 October. The report analyses the implications of this test, as well as programs in India, Israel, Sweden, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, and others. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) argued that India was the only new state likely to develop nuclear weapons, concluding that “there will not be a widespread proliferation …over the next decade.”

This document offers an East German assessment of Romania's attitude towards China. It emphasizes that the Romanian Communist Party approves of the Chinese Maoist line and agrees with Beijing's domestic and foreign policies. Romania's foreign policy is said to attribute the same importance to relations with China as to relations with the Soviet Union. It also notes that the Romanian government has given more publicity to the resumption of diplomatic relations between China and West Germany than it did to similar moves between East Germany and India. The authors identify an anti-Soviet bias in the Romanian position, which the authors believe undermines the unity of the Socialist countries.

(Excerpts) Minutes of discussions of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee concerning non-proliferation. The Romanian delegation argues against a joint declaration of the Warsaw Pact on non-proliferation for fear that it might be used against China. The other delegations argue that a joint declaration is necessary in order to prevent the creation of the Multilaterall Nuclear Force proposed by NATO.