The Bulgarian diplomatic mission (legation or embassy) to the US reported to the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sofia what actions the embassy executed and planned to execute to prevent seizure of documents during the "international situation," or Cuban Missile Crisis. Enclosed in the letter is an explanation of items destroyed and items placed under heightened security. The letter also includes information about security for the embassy staff.

Van Roijen continues on the conversation he had with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk from the last cable. Rusk believes Cuba may be aligning more with China and is factoring in Chinese interests in Cuba. However, Rusk also saw Chinese initiatives in North Korea and North Vietnam. The relationship with China is, in his words, "not a long-term worry like Moscow but a short-term worry."

The cable concerns a conversation between Dutch ambassador J. Herman van Roijen and U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Rusk said the Cuban issue still was a source of concern, with the upcoming anniversary of the Cuban Revolution, and was concerned about Havana in particular. Rusk conjectured that one of three things would happen: 1) Castro would announce joining the Non-Aligned Movement; 2) The extremists within the Communist Party would overthrow Castro; 3) A revolution against both Castro and the Russians would be mounted. The conversation concludes with Rusk complimenting President Kennedy for his aggressive yet prudent stance against the Soviets during the crisis.

The cable from van Roijen concerns a conversation between him and Director of UN Political Affairs at the U.S. Department of State Joseph Sisco. Sisco informs van Roijen that the Kennedy Administration has decided to let the Cuban issue quietly die, boiling down to the United States and the Soviet Union "agreeing to disagree." The State Department does not think there should be further debate on the issue in the UN Security Council because the U.S. is not willing to make further concessions while there have been no UN inspections. Sisco also reports that the Soviets have made a commitment to withdraw all combat troops from Cuba.

The cable is centered around Cuba and the Organization of American States (OAS). Van Roijen and Ward P. Allen discuss a cable intercepted from Venezuela about possible attempts of sabotage by pro-Castro organizations in Caracas. However, there is no report from the U.S. Embassy Caracas to confirm this. There are, however, protests being reported in the American-aligned Latin American countries, which is seen as an attempt by Cuba to stir revolutionary sentiment in these countries. The size and frequency of these protests by pro-Castro and communist groups is very limited.

The cable concerns a conversation between Dutch Ambassador to the United States van Roijen and Director Ward P. Allen of the State Department's Bureau of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, regarding further actions of the Organization of American States (OAS) in the aftermath of the Cuban crisis. Allen made note that he had very little information regarding Cuba and how Cuba would fit into future dealings with the OAS.

Van Roijen writes again about the current situation in Washington just as the Cuban Missile Crisis is drawing to a close. The White House issued a statement regarding a proposal by Khrushchev. The statement's tough stance is attributed to Khrushchev's morning message which was completely different in content and tone to the personal message sent to Kennedy. The personal message amounted to admitting humiliating defeat by the Soviets with no mention of withdrawal of the U.S. missiles in Turkey. Van Roijen concludes that Kennedy made the right response to the previously offered Soviet deal, and kept the door open for consultation. The Cuban threat is almost "disappeared."

Van Roijen relates that the U.S. State Department has great interest in learning about the mood in Cuba, particularly Havana. Van Roijen asks the Minister of Foreign Affairs to forward all of Boissevain's correspondences including his personal letters to him.

Van Roijen relates the current situation in Washington and the American view on the crisis. The removal of the missiles was a non-negotiable issue for the Americans, as Secretary of State Dean Rusk declared their removal was absolutely essential. In the mind of American statesmen, the missiles in Cuba was directly connected to the 1961 Berlin crisis, as it was a new Soviet technique. The hurried construction of the bases was reported to go on, meaning time is of the utmost essence. The Americans were not above considering force to resolve the crisis, although this was relegated to a worst-case scenario.

This cable comes from Dutch Ambassador to the United States J. Herman van Roijen, regarding the subject of Cuba and the discovered Soviet missiles. Van Roijen reports on the current status of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, noting that the Soviets are willing to dismantle the missiles in Cuba if the Americans would do for "obscolescent bases near Soviet territory." The State Department fervently denied that any such tradeoff would happen or was even being considered.