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November 1, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Moscow (Jaszczuk), 1 November 1962

Jaszczuk thinks that the public announcements that the US will not invade Cuba are a good start, but that they need to be "encapsulated in some kind of an international document."

October 31, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington, 31 October 1962

Arthur Schlesinger, advisor to President Kennedy, confirms Drozniak's previous telegram report that " In [Schlesinger's] opinion, the assessment of the Soviet installation of the missiles in Cuba as the attempt to strengthen the [world] position of the USSR before a possible confrontation over Berlin, ended up prevailing within the US administration."

October 31, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Moscow (Jaszczuk), 31 October 1962

US Ambassador Foy D. Kohler tells Jaszczuk that "The United States will not go into Cuba and it does not intend to topple Castro from outside of Cuba."

October 30, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 30 October 1962

Jelen continues his analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

October 29, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 29 October 1962

Jelen relays information on several recent diplomatic actions of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

October 28, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Havana (Jeleń), 28 October 1962

Jelen discusses the various diplomatic communication channels that are taking place during the Cuban Missile Crisis through speeches, letters, phone conversations, etc., mostly between the leaders of the US, the USSR and Cuba.

October 26, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 26 October 1962

According to Drozniak, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk has allegedly reported that the latest statements of journalists claiming the relaxation of tensions in the Cuban Missile Crisis do not correspond to the reality of serious tensions between the US and USSR.

October 26, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 26 October 1962

Drozniak makes an assessment of the Cuban Missile Crisis situation, based on his conversations with foreign diplomats and respected journalists. Among other topics, he includes his opinion that "The operation of installing the [Soviet] missiles in Cuba was carried out in great hurry, without special adherence to secrecy, and perhaps even with the awareness that the missiles would be discovered relatively quickly. This [fact] has been interpreted [by the Americans] as [a possible] attempt by the USSR to test Kennedy’s “the will and readiness to fight.” [Soviet leader Nikita S.] Khrushchev chose Cuba, because he considered Berlin to be too dangerous."

October 25, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 25 October 1962

Drozniak discusses the ongoing Cuban Missile Crisis situation, including the rumors of a possible US military invasion of Cuba.

October 24, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Moscow (Paszkowski), 24 October 1962

Paszkowski discusses changes in the tensions of the Cuban Missile Crisis situation, including his opinion that the US's recent actions and rhetoric were a pre-election bluff.

Pagination