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October 20, 1988

Record of Conversation between Hwang Jang-yeop and A. Yakovlev

The North Korean CC KWP secretary meets with the Soviet CC CPSU secretary and discusses the problem of the expansion of U.S. imperialism in the Asia Pacific. The North Korean CC KWP secretary stresses the issue of the unification of Korea and express the hope that the CPSU will influence other socialist countries so that they do not attempt to establish political relations with South Korea.

April 9, 1981

Special Assistant for NPI, NFAC, CIA, to Resource Management Staff, Office of Program Assessment et al, 'Request for Review of Draft Paper on the Security Dimension of Non-Proliferation'

Just a few months into President Reagan’s first term his administration wanted to make its own mark on nonproliferation policy. The report suggests building “broader bilateral relationship[s]” and offering political and security incentives could persuade states considering developing nuclear weapons to cease these efforts.

May 13, 1974

Letter from Government of North Korea

Letter from The Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the U.S. Senate formally proposing that talks be held for the conclusion of a peace agreement between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the United States of America.

February 28, 1976

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 067.043

The Embassy of Romania in Pyongyang summarizes North Korea's response to the introduction of F-111 bombers to South Korea based on comments from the Press Department of the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

October 11, 1975

Telegram from Washington to Bucharest, No. 075119

Romanian diplomats report that Washington considers the situation in Korea to be very dangerous, that a withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Korea could prompt South Korea to develop nuclear weapons, and that the Algerian-sponsored resolution in support of North Korea at the United Nations General Assembly is unacceptable.

July 24, 1975

Telegram from Washington to Bucharest, No. 074.783

Buffum and Bogdan discuss the US concern regarding the upcoming coming UN general assembly meeting, in which the issue of dismantling the UN headquarters in Korea remains on the agenda, as Buffum hopes to accompany the dismantlement with assurances protecting the armistice, but is worried about North Korea's unpredictable behavior.

June 7, 1973

Telegram from Washington, DC, No.084.504, Urgent, SECRET

Romanian official in the US warns Bucharest that relaying the letter from the DPRK to US public officials in the manner requested by Pyongyang may damage Romanian relations with the US. The official recommends a more normal procedure recommended to him by US officials and suggests convincing the North Koreans to follow a different method of sending its message to US congress.

September 15, 1975

Note for Ltg. Brent Scowscroft from John A. Wickham, Jr., “Defense of UNC Controlled Islands"

John A Wickham, Jr., writes to General Brent Scowscroft about the U.S. defense commitment to the five northwest island groups and U.S.-South Korean defense coordination.

April 11, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.119, Urgent, SECRET

Conversation between Romanian and Soviet representatives reveals that North Koreans are slowly withdrawing from direct contacts with South Korea. Instead, Pyongyang is seeking external support for its position. Meanwhile, North Korea is now looking at China with increased suspicion after Zhou Enlai noted that Beijing was not interested in the withdrawal of US troops from Asia. On another note, North Korea asks the Soviets to forbid South Koreans to enter the Soviet Union for the University Olympics held there.

April 4, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang, No.061.113, Urgent, SECRET

KWP Centeral Committee member Kim Yeongnam explains to the Romanian representative that the DPRK proposed changes in the North-South Coordination Committee meeting to ease tensions and transform the armistice into a peace treaty. Kim blames the South Korean hawks and separatists who abide by the interests of the US and Japan for the lack of progress. Despite the impasse, the North Koreans look to the internal dissent against Park Chung Hee in South Korea as a sign of support for Pyongyang.

Pagination