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Documents

April 22, 1974

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.180

Heo Dam seeks to replace the armistice with a peace treaty and establish direct contact with the United States to remove American troops from the peninsula.

March 24, 1974

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.127

In the aftermath of the failed inter-Korean dialogues, the North Koreans conclude that they must establish diplomatic relations with the United States. The telegram describes the rationale behind the move and the goal of limiting the interference of the United States on the Korean Peninsula. According to the author, North Korea believes that the rejection of the US to establish relations with the DPRK will expose Washington's opposition to the unification of Korea.

November 26, 1973

Telegram from New York to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 052312

The document describes a consensus at the UN regarding the Korean issue after an understanding was reached between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai. Thea author observes that some of the US media believes that the US came to a compromise solution with China because Nixon wanted to avoid having more political issues.

October 27, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang, SECRET, No.061482, Urgent

Popa notes Kim Yeong-nam's concern regarding interference of the USSR and USA in the Yom Kippur/October War as a source of a wider conflict, contrary to the optimism expressed by the North Korean leadership.

July 31, 1973

Telegram from New York to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 091.722, Normal

Romanians note that the Chinese are worried about the possible vacuum left behind on the Korean Peninsula if the US withdraws from South Korea. The telegram notes that the Chinese will not oppose continued US presence in South Korea even after the dissolution of the UN Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.

June 26, 1973

Telegram from Washington, DC, No.084.605, Urgent, SECRET

Romanian officials in Washington report that they submitted the letter from the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly, intended for the US congress, to the US State Department. The US official in contact with the Romanians described North Korea's attitudes towards the joint accession of the two Koreas to the UN as unrealistic.

June 25, 1973

Telegram from Beijing, No.059.658, Urgent, SECRET

Romanian official comments on statements made by Premier Zhou Enlai that appeared on China's Renmin Ribao. The official notes that Zhou does not condition Sino-American relations on US withdrawal from South Korea, Taiwan and South Vietnam. In fact, the official comments how Taiwan is overlooked and withdrawal of US troops from Korea is characterized as a request from Kim Il Sung.

September 15, 1975

Note for Ltg. Brent Scowscroft from John A. Wickham, Jr., “Defense of UNC Controlled Islands"

John A Wickham, Jr., writes to General Brent Scowscroft about the U.S. defense commitment to the five northwest island groups and U.S.-South Korean defense coordination.

March 14, 1975

Memorandum for Richard Smyser from Morton I. Abramowitz, “26-27 February Yellow Sea Incident (U)"

Morton I. Abramowitz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, provides Richard Smyser with a chronology of events surrounding the February 26-27, 1975, incident in Yellow Sea between North and South Korea.

May 5, 1973

Telegram from the First Directorate to Washington, DC, No.01/04493

North Korea asks Romania to forward a letter to the president of the US Senate, Spiro T. Agnew, and separately, the Speaker of the House, Carl Albert. The letter, adopted by the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly, will request the US to withdraw its forces from the Korean Peninsula, terminate military aid to South Korea, and dismantle the UN Commission for the Unification and Reconstruction of Korea.

Pagination