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Documents

September 4, 1947

Letter, V.M. Molotov to George C. Marshall

Molotov blames the Americans for the failure of the US-Soviet Joint Commission on Korea and rejects the latest proposals put forth by Robert A. Lovett.

May 19, 1977

Memorandum for Jimmy Carter from Warren Christopher, 'US Policy in Korea: Withdrawal of Ground Combat Forces'

Warren Christopher sent papers on measures to sustain deterrence in Korea, summarizing major issues including ground force withdrawal schedule, defense compensation package and Air Force Deployment.

December 6, 1957

CDS Report No. 66 from Choi Duk Shin to the President (Syngman Rhee)

Choi Duk Shin reports on Japanese PM Kishi's trip to Southeast Asia, the promotion of Korea-Vietnam cultural relations, the upcoming SEATO war maneuvers in Thailand, and other recent Vietnam and regional affairs.

December 1957

Draft Letter from Choi Duk Shin to the President (Syngman Rhee)

In this draft, Choi Duk Shin discusses the 'two-fold' threat of communism and Japanese expansionism in Asia, urging President Rhee to establish a solid collective security structure against these threats as soon as possible.

November 15, 1956

CDS Report No. 24 from Choi Duk Shin to the President (Syngman Rhee)

Choi Duk Shin offers his views on the crises in Hungary and the Middle East, urges President Rhee to organize immediate action against communist countries, and reports on Vietnamese domestic affairs including the recent typhoon and the continued Chinese minority debate.

August 7, 1953

Summary Record of the Conference held between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles (Third Session)

President Rhee and Secretary Dulles have concluded the final negotiations for the US-ROK defense pact and now both believe it is time to inform the American and Korean public. Rhee emphasizes that he will not accept Korean neutralization and it is imperative to remove the Chinese from the north. Dulles states that the US will do its best to unify Korea under one peaceful government and will try to remove the Chinese aggressors in the north.

August 3, 1953

Confidential Memorandum, Before Agreeing to the Armistice Agreement

When the United States agreed to a truce talk to end the Korea War, President Syngman Rhee disapproved. He opposed the truce and tried to attack these peace proceedings through a serious of events- such as releasing thousands of prisoners of war and creating turmoil for the US government. In order to persuade Rhee to accept the armistice defense, the US dispatches Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson to meet with the South Korean president in a series of bargaining discussions. Eventually, under certain conditions and a mutual defense pact with the US, Rhee agrees to the armistice.

August 6, 1953

Summary Memorandum, US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty (August 6)

In 1953, Secretary Dulles met President Rhee to discuss the US-ROK mutual defense treaty. This summary memorandum notes twelve of Rhee’s requests and/or points he will like this treaty to incorporate. These include the number of ROKA divisions, which economic model the US should use to help Korea’s economy, and the request for moral and material support for the ROK to resume war with the north. This summary also notes whether the US granted, wanted to further discuss, or rejected each point.

August 6, 1953

Summary Record of the Conference held between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles (Second Session)

During the second Dulles-Rhee conference, President Rhee and Secretary Dulles led the discussion with the subject of Korean rehabilitation. Rhee makes a few suggestions that both sides should consider if Korean reconstruction should take place. These suggestions include: 1) rehabilitating Korean productive industry, 2) directly allocating money for Korea’s rehabilitation instead of doing so through the reconstruction of the Japanese economy and, 3) prevent the importation of Japanese technicians to Korea. Dulles answers he will consider Rhee suggestions, however, the US will continue to aid Japan to prevent losing her to communism.

August 14, 1953

Memorandum, President Syngman Rhee to All Diplomatic Officials

Following the ratification of the Armistice Agreement and the Mutual Defense Treaty, President Rhee conveys that he expects the Armistice to fail because the communists will “undoubtedly” violate it and undermine Korean independence. Rhee wants to renew war to secure victory but most importantly to strengthen the ROK-U.S alliance. Following the memorandum he makes twelve points ranging from topic like Korean rehabilitation to prisoners of war from the Korean War.

Pagination