The report examines the implications of the changes in the Warsaw Pact's new military doctrine adopted in May 1987 and its emphasis on the future defensive character of the alliance. The new doctrine stresses that the Warsaw Pact will never initiate military actions against another country unless it is attacked first, the Warsaw Pact will never employ nuclear weapons first, and the Warsaw Pact has no territorial claims against any other country in or outside of Europe.

This memo to Vasily Kuznetsov, First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, includes proposed amendments and clarifications to various articles and sections of the NPT. Topics of the proposed amendments include an emphasis on the continued importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity and the exchange of research and technology on peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The document also describes how to proceed in negotiations with the American side, as well as with several Warsaw Pact countries, and to telegraph once the requests in the memo have been delivered.

This decree tasks the Soviet MFA with obtaining an agreement from fellow members of the Warsaw Pact on the USSR's suggested revisions to the NPT.

Andrei Gromyko describes the diplomatic measures he deems necessary to ensure the adherence of influential nations and countries in the Socialist sphere to the NPT. Valuing negotiation and diplomatic conversations between representatives, Gromyko especially seeks to obtain the support of countries who have previously expressed reservations about the treaty.

Talking points for Soviet ambassadors to Socialist states to use in conversation with Minister of Foreign Affairs. The ambassadors are told to relay the message that adherence to the NPT is beneficial for all Socialist nations and their allies.

This document references the draft model agreement of non-nuclear weapons states, instructing both the Soviet MFA and the Ministry of Medium Machine Building (which supervised the Soviet nuclear industry) to conduct negotiations with the US to solidify this agreement. After negotiating with the Americans, they are instructed to make sure that the project is approved by the IAEA Board of Governors and inform socialist UN member states and the GDR about the Soviet position on the NPT.

In this note to the CPSU CC, Andrei Gromyko lists the ministers of foreign affairs who will be coming to Moscow to sign the NPT. Ministers from these three Socialist nations are confirmed as guests: Czechoslovakia, GDR, and the Mongolian People's Republic.

This document is a communication to the Soviet UN delegation in New York, written by Vasily Vasilievich Kuznetsov, the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

With a nuclear nonproliferation treaty under consideration in Washington, INR considered which countries were likely to sign on and why or why not. INR analysts, mistakenly as it turned out, believed it unlikely that the Soviet Union would be a co-sponsor of a treaty in part because of the “international climate” and also because Moscow and Washington differed on whether a treaty would recognize a “group capability.”

Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”