This document, most likely from 1990-91, discusses Iran's request to the Soviet Union for assistance in the design of Tactical Missile System. The writer expresses the opinion that assistance should not be provided in the interest of preventing further escalation between Iran and Israel.

Sergey Khrushchev, son of Nikita Khrushchev, recalls the 1954 transfer of Crimea from Soviet Russian to Soviet Ukraine. At the time it was an uncontroversial decision, but later after the fall of the Soviet Union the loss of Crimea was seen in a negative light by the Russian public.

Meeting minutes from Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet during which the transfer of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine was approved.

Korotchenko and Nizhnik report that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR adopted a decree approving the transfer of Crimea to the Ukraine.

Decree by the Ukrainian SSR (here abbreviated USSR) approving of the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine.

Minutes recording a decree for the transfer of Crimea from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (here abbreviated USSR).

Decree announcing the transfer of Crimea from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic to the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (here abbreviated USSR).

Information on KGB counter-intelligence surveillance of Soviet tourists vacationing in other socialist countries who had contact with foreigners. The document states that Western intelligence services organized “friendship meetings” through tourist firms to meet Soviet citizens, gauge their loyalty to the USSR, and obtain political, economic, and military intelligence. KGB counter-intelligence paid particular attention to Soviet citizens who were absent from their groups, took side trips to different cities or regions, made telephone calls to foreigners, or engaged in “ideologically harmful” conversations in the presence of foreigners. Mirokhin regrets that the KGB underestimated the strengths and methodology of Western intelligence services. He concludes that the KGB should have adopted some of the same methods, and targeted Western tourists visiting socialist countries.

This folder consists of a detailed operational plan for cooperation between the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB for the years 1975-1978. Specific objectives include penetrating the military, political, and economic establishments of the United States, Britain, West Germany, France, and NATO, impeding the activities of the Czech Congress of National Development (KNR), collecting information on “Zionist intrigues,” gathering scientific/technical information on Western achievements in the fields of biological, chemical, and thermonuclear weapons, and using active measures to curtail the activities of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in West Germany.

Information on the situation in the Middle East prepared by KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov in April 1973, prior to a 7 May 1973 discussion in the Politburo.

Andropov stated that given the increase in anti-Israeli propaganda in Egypt and Syria, as well as the heightened state of readiness of their armies, it was possible that a coalition of Middle Eastern states could resume military operations against Israel before, or during the upcoming Nixon-Brezhnev summit.

To prevent this, the KGB initiated a series of active measures. Specifically, they dispatched KPSU Politburo Candidate Member K.G. Mazurov to speak with Egyptian President Sadat and Syrian President Assad on the USSR’s behalf; informed the United States government through unofficial channels that a resumption of hostilities in the Middle East was not in Moscow’s interests; delayed the delivery of new Soviet surface to surface missiles to Egypt; and dispatched a well known Soviet journalist specializing in Middle Eastern affairs to Cairo and Damascus to study the situation.