Contains memos issued by the General Military Intelligence Directorate (GMID), last dated 6 July 1988, regarding the following issues: The use of chemical weapons by the Iranian Army during the Iran-Iraq War, stating dates and places where they were used; the attempts of Iran to produce chemical weapons relying on the assistance of North Korea, Syria and West Germany; developing some Iranian insecticide factories to be able to produce chemical weapons; types of chemical weapons which are used or produced by Iran, such
as mustard Gas, C factor, phosgene factor, white phosphorus, sarin gas. Page 27 contains correspondence by the Iraqi Military Attache Office in Cairo to the GMID, dated 14 September 1988, regarding information received from the Egyptian Intelligence about Iran's attempts to obtain chemical weapons from Spain through mediators and to provide Libya with chemical weapons in return for supplying Scud B missiles.

Transcript of a meeting between President Saddam Hussein amd Iraqi officials, taking place sometime between 4-20 November 1979. Saddam discusses relations with Europe, Russia, China, the Gulf countries, and the United States. Iraqi officials criticize Libya and Syria for their support to Iran. Another official criticizes the Egyptian President Anwar Al-Sadat for his attitudes in making peace agreement with Israel. Saddam accuses the Americans of playing a central role in overthrowing the Shah of Iran.

Ulbricht writes to Brezhnev about the delegation to the UAR, led by Mr. Weiss. Ulbricht assesses the political situation in the UAR with respect to Nasser and the weak situation of the Arab Socialist Union. Ulbricht also informs Brezhnev about the situation in the SAR, which seems to be worsening due to a lack of concepts for postwar recovery. Ulbricht suggests sending economic and political experts in order to strengthen the cooperation between the UAR, the SAR and the socialist countries.

Ulbricht expresses his consent for the measures proposed by the Soviet leadership. He underlines the demand for an Israeli withdrawal and points out that otherwise it would be necessary to lead a war of attrition against the Israeli occupation forces. The participation of volunteers from the socialist countries would be necessary, but would require further consideration.

Ulbricht informs Brezhnev about his visit to the UAR following an invitation from Nasser. He also says that he wants to get in contact with the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs in order to establish a common line to present to the UAR. Ulbricht also announces a visit to the SAR and Iraq.

Minutes of conversation between Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito and UAR President Gamal Abdel Nasser with occasional input from advisors. Nasser describes the situation in the Middle East, including Egypt's relations with the United States and fighting along the Suez Canal. The two leaders also discuss UN Special Envoy Gunnar Jarring's recent activities. Tito closes with a recount of his visit to Japan, Mongolia, Iran, and Moscow and an update of the Yugoslav economy.

Polish document describing the speech given by Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) on the actions undertaken by the Soviet leadership before and during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Brezhnev tells the CC CPSU plenum that the Arab struggle in the Middle East has both a class struggle and a national liberation dimension. Brezhnev blames Israeli aggression for the start of the war and Arab blunders and low morale for the humiliating defeat of the UAR forces. Given the success of the Israeli Defense Forces, the Soviets were forced to consider diplomatic and political methods for saving the Arab leadership. When Israeli forces did not stop their aggression against Syria, threatening to overrun the Syrian capital of Damascus, Brezhnev claims tells the CC CPSU that Soviet leadership warned the Americans that the Soviet Army would have to intervene and, at the same time, threatened the Israeli that any further actions would result in Soviet involvement in the war. Brezhnev claims that, since the war ended just hours after the Soviets had made their threats, the imperialist powers acquiesced to Soviet demands. This documents is a translation of the version the Soviet leadership sent to the United Polish Workers’ Party for the information of the Polish leadership.

The two leaders talk about recent developments in the Middle East, US-Arab relations, and Soviet support for Arab regimes.

This 25 April 1974 directive from the Centre is attributed to an author identified as “Sviridov.” It was sent to KGB Line A residencies in Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Aden, Samaa, and others, and contains instructions for planning “active measures.”

“Sviridov” identified a variety of channels through which the KGB could influence Middle Eastern governments, militaries, and political groups, while suppressing anti-Soviet groups. Additionally, the residencies were instructed to plan active measures in advance to prepare for future contingencies.

In an explanatory note, Mitrokhin explains that “Sviridov” is a pseudonym for then KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov, and that Line A is the arm of the KGB concerned with active measures intended to influence foreign countries.

Information on the situation in the Middle East prepared by KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov in April 1973, prior to a 7 May 1973 discussion in the Politburo.

Andropov stated that given the increase in anti-Israeli propaganda in Egypt and Syria, as well as the heightened state of readiness of their armies, it was possible that a coalition of Middle Eastern states could resume military operations against Israel before, or during the upcoming Nixon-Brezhnev summit.

To prevent this, the KGB initiated a series of active measures. Specifically, they dispatched KPSU Politburo Candidate Member K.G. Mazurov to speak with Egyptian President Sadat and Syrian President Assad on the USSR’s behalf; informed the United States government through unofficial channels that a resumption of hostilities in the Middle East was not in Moscow’s interests; delayed the delivery of new Soviet surface to surface missiles to Egypt; and dispatched a well known Soviet journalist specializing in Middle Eastern affairs to Cairo and Damascus to study the situation.