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Documents

April 26, 1966

Extracts from the Reply of Ambassador Sette Camara

India and the United Arab Republic criticized disarmament in the regional terms.

July 11, 1967

Report of the Inter-ministerial Expert Committee for the HSWP PC on military support for 'friendly' Arab countries in 1967

This document lists the requests for aid and armaments to Hungary by the United Arab Republic, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan, and the amounts and types of aid and armaments that Hungary and the rest of the Eastern Bloc propose to give.

May 26, 1966

Report from the Hungarian Embassy in Cario on Kosygin's visit in the UAR

This report describes the visit of Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin to the United Arab Republic (UAR) during which he reinforced positive relations with President Nasser and the UAR and discussed the Vietnam War, Sino-Soviet tensions, the Arab World, Israel, and economic concerns.

January 31, 1958

Report of the Hungarian Ambassador in Cairo on the establishment of the United Arab Republic and the Syrian public opinion in 1958 (exceprts)

This report by the Hungarian ambassador in Cairo states that the Syrian people are wary toward President Nasser’s creation of the United Arab Republic, fearing he will enforce a dictatorship, however the Syrian communist party is in full support of the union.

October 28, 1962

Letter from Premier Zhou Enlai to His Excellency Ne Win

Zhou Enlai writes to Ne Win in order to clarify China's positions on the Line of Actual Control and the Sino-Indian border dispute.

August 19, 1969

Policy Memorandum from the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 05/03901, 'Request of the United Arab Republic Government that Romania Stops Using the Oil Pipeline Eilat-Mediterranean Sea to Transport Crude Imported from Iran'

Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister, Petru Burlacu met with the charge d'affaires of the United Arab Republic in Bucharest, Fikry Mehanny Nakhla. Nakhla told Burlacu that he had discovered that the Romanians used the Eilat-Mediterranean Sea pipeline to transport oil from Iran which went through Egypt, and asked that this stop. Romanian government decided to leave this request unanswered. Topics of memorandum also included bilateral relations between Romania and Iran.

October 14, 1961

Memorandum of Conversation from the Meeting between Vice Premier Chen Yi and the Albanian Ambassador to China Reis Malile

Chen Yi and Reis Malile discuss Sino-Albanian trade and Syria's secession from the United Arab Republic.

July 23, 1965

Record of Conversation between Vice-Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua and North Korean Ambassador in China Pak Se-chang

Qiao Guanhua and Pak Se-chang discuss the four-party meeting between China, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the United Arab Republic (Egypt), the Afro-Asian Conference, and the situation in Algeria.

January 20, 1966

National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-66, 'The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation'

This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.

July 26, 1968

Information about the Results of the Negotiations by the Soviet Leaders with President Nasser

The document describes the negotiations between Soviet leaders and Nasser, which mainly focused on the conflict in the Middle East and the possible recognition of the GDR by the United Arab Republic. Nasser emphasized that there would be no direct talks between the UAR and Israel, but that the UAR would be willing to take part in a UN negotiated attempt to solve the conflict, upon the condition that Israel withdraw its troops from the occupied territories. Nasser was reluctant to follow the Soviet demand for a diplomatic recognition of the GDR.

Pagination