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Documents

January 31, 1962

Research Memorandum REU-25 from Roger Hilsman to Mr. Kohler, 'European Attitudes on Independent Nuclear Capability'

Concerns about the credibility of US nuclear deterrence generated Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Lauris Norstad’s proposal for a NATO-controlled medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. This lengthy report represented INR’s assessment of “present and future European interest in national or multinational nuclear weapons capabilities,” including the MRBM proposal, and the extent to which an “enhancement of NATO's nuclear role” could “deter national or multinational European nuclear weapons programs.”

May 13, 1959

Department of State Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Information Brief No. 139, 'Disarmament Negotiations: The Fourth Power Problem: France'

According to intelligence reports, the French were trying to acquire from US firms the diagnostic technology needed to measure a nuclear explosion. INR did not believe that France had identified a specific test site and noted that France was under pressure to hold a test somewhere other than North Africa; nevertheless it went ahead with one in Algeria in early 1960.

June 4, 1957

Department of State Office of Intelligence Research, 'OIR Contribution to NIE 100-6-57: Nuclear Weapons Production by Fourth Countries – Likelihood and Consequences'

This lengthy report was State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research's contribution to the first National Intelligence Estimate on the nuclear proliferation, NIE 100-6-57. Written at a time when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were the only nuclear weapons states, the “Fourth Country” problem referred to the probability that some unspecified country, whether France or China, was likely to be the next nuclear weapons state. Enclosed with letter from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Division of Research for USSR and Western Europe, to Roger Mateson, 4 June 1957, Secret

July 2, 1975

Letter, L. N. Ray, High Commissioner of India, Wellington, 'French Nuclear Test'

France conducted a nuclear test on the South Pacific atoll which New Zealand criticized.

October 29, 1960

Ten-Year Strategy Report by the General Staff of Defense (SMD) on Military problems of NATO to Minister of Defense Andreotti

This ten-year strategy report created by the SMD is about perspectives and problems that NATO should face in developing a military strategy. Topics: French nuclear strategy; NATO tactical and strategic nuclear weapons; the relevance of conventional weapons; possible improvement in the decision to use nuclear weapons; nuclear cooperation and integration in NATO countries.

February 21, 1957

Telegram from Couve de Murville

November 9, 1956

Note by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Economic Cooperation

This note describes panel discussions, which took place on the visit of Chancellor Adenauer to Paris, helping to reach an agreement on outstanding issues regarding Euratom.

October 21, 1956

Proposal of the Euratom Experts Concerning the Dissemination of Military Knowledge

This proposal from the French delegation describes the potential military uses for atomic energy.

June 14, 1975

Memorandum from Thomas O. Enders to the Secretary, 'Draft Letter to Sauvagnargues'

This memorandum describes Henry Kissinger's response to French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues who requested a 27 member group to meet on issues similar to the previous nuclear suppliers' group meeting. Kissinger lists the complications that could arise from this and suggests not doing so. Document also includes another letter from Kissinger to Sauvagnargues regarding the important of nuclear export issues, as well as Kissinger's advisers suggestions to not send the letters to France just yet.

April 19, 1975

State Department telegram 90533 to US Embassy Paris, 'Exploratory Meeting of Nuclear Suppliers'

Kissinger met with the French ambassador and provided the necessary assurances. Agreements would be based on consensus, decisions would not be retroactive, and the suppliers meetings would be “informal and confidential.” This arrangement assured that the suppliers’ group would operate on a lowest-common-denominator basis, but there was no choice because French participation was vital.

Pagination