Andrei Gromyko updates the CPSU CC on the proceedings of the 22nd Session of the General Assembly, as it pertains to the NPT. In this note, he states that the Soviet delegation has arranged for the NPT to open for signatures immediately after the conclusion of all deliberation on the non-proliferation issue. Gromyko also points out that the US has agreed to open the treaty to signatures on July 1, 1968.

The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs announces its decision to open the NPT for signing in Moscow, Washington, and London beginning on July 1, 1968.

This press release acts as an example for journalists to follow when covering the proceedings of the NPT's signing. Along with basic information about the nations involved in the signing of the NPT, the document lists the names of every notable Soviet official who will be present at the event.

The CPSU CC outlines the details and logistics of the NPT's signing in Moscow. Along with nominating a reception hall and authorizing Gromyko to sign the treaty, this decree focuses on the publication of an official memorandum suggesting urgent measures to end the arms race.

This document is a communication to the Soviet UN delegation in New York, written by Vasily Vasilievich Kuznetsov, the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

This document is a communication to the Soviet UN delegation in New York, written by Vasily Vasilievich Kuznetsov, the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs describes its contingency plan in case the US and UK refuse to sign the NPT in Geneva. This plan entails opening the treaty for signatures at the same time in Moscow, Washington, and London, using (presumably) the 1966 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies as a precedent for signing an agreement in three places at once.

With a nuclear nonproliferation treaty under consideration in Washington, INR considered which countries were likely to sign on and why or why not. INR analysts, mistakenly as it turned out, believed it unlikely that the Soviet Union would be a co-sponsor of a treaty in part because of the “international climate” and also because Moscow and Washington differed on whether a treaty would recognize a “group capability.”

Lord Chalfont described the international agreement on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as a new phase in negotiations on disarmament.

(Excerpts) Minutes of discussions of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee concerning non-proliferation. The Romanian delegation argues against a joint declaration of the Warsaw Pact on non-proliferation for fear that it might be used against China. The other delegations argue that a joint declaration is necessary in order to prevent the creation of the Multilaterall Nuclear Force proposed by NATO.

Letter from Gomulka to Khrushchev discussing Polish opposition to Soviet proposal for a Non-Proliferation Treaty. Gomulka suggests that the treaty will further split the communist camp. While discussing the state of Sino-Soviet relations, the Polish leader suggests that the Soviet Union and the PRC adopt a common position in matters of foreign policy in order to strengthen the power of the Socialist camp.