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The Taj Mahal Shrine in Agra, India.

South Asia

India

Photograph of the Port of Jaffa in Israel.

Middle East

Israel

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

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Pakistan

Egyptian Pyramids

Northern Africa

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North America

United States

Nuclear Proliferation

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United States. Central Intelligence Agency

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Bandung Conference 1955

Bandung Conference, 1955

Indian Nuclear History

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Cambodian-Vietnamese War, 1977-1991

George H.W. Bush and Lech Walesa

CIA Reports on the Collapse of Communism in Europe

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China. Foreign Ministry

1949-

Photograph of Zhou Enlai in 1972.

Zhou, Enlai

1898- 1976

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Hughes, Thomas Lowe

1925-

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Yeltsin, Boris

1931- 2007

Soviet Foreign Policy

PRC Vice Premier Chen Yi

Chen, Yi

1901- 1972

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December 1979	Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, NI IIM 79-10028, 'The 22 September 1979 Event' [2004 Release] This study begins, as the National Security Council requested, by assuming that the September 22, 1979 Vela event was a nuclear detonation. It discusses the possibility that the detonation could have occurred due to an accident, and noted the Defense Intelligence Agency’s suggestion that the Soviet Union might have had reasons to conduct a covert test in violation of its treaty commitments. But most of the study is concerned with other possibilities to explain the incident – a secret test by South Africa or Israel, or India, or Pakistan, or a secret joint test by South Africa and Israel. The 2004 version, in some instances, contains more information through page 10 than the 2013 version.
December 1979	Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, NI IIM 79-10028, 'The 22 September 1979 Event' [2013 Release] This study begins, as the National Security Council requested, by assuming that the September 22, 1979 Vela event was a nuclear detonation. It discusses the possibility that the detonation could have occurred due to an accident, and noted the Defense Intelligence Agency’s suggestion that the Soviet Union might have had reasons to conduct a covert test in violation of its treaty commitments. But most of the study is concerned with other possibilities to explain the incident – a secret test by South Africa or Israel, or India, or Pakistan, or a secret joint test by South Africa and Israel. The 2013 release (which is currently under appeal) includes some information from a “Secret Test by Others” (Pakistan, India) and the map on page 12 that had not been released before.
July 1982	National Intelligence Estimate, NIE-4-82, 'Nuclear Proliferation Trends Through 1987' With proliferation becoming a “greater threat to US interests over the next five years,” intelligence analysts believed that the “disruptive aspect of the proliferation phenomenon will constitute the greater threat to the United States.” While the estimators saw “low potential” for terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons, the likelihood of terrorist/extortionist hoaxes was on the upswing. Significant portions of the NIE are excised, especially the estimate of Israel’s nuclear arsenal and its impact in the Middle East. Nevertheless, much information remains on the countries of greatest concern: Iraq and Libya in the Near East, India and Pakistan in South Asia, Brazil and Argentina in Latin America, and the Republic of South Africa, as well as those of lesser concern: Iran, Egypt, Taiwan and the two Koreas.
October 21, 1964	National Intelligence Estimate NIE 4-2-64, 'Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Over the Next Decade' This US analysis of the likelihood of nuclear proliferation during the next decade was finished only days after the first Chinese nuclear test on 16 October. The report analyses the implications of this test, as well as programs in India, Israel, Sweden, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, and others. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) argued that India was the only new state likely to develop nuclear weapons, concluding that “there will not be a widespread proliferation …over the next decade.”
April 23, 1964	Letter from Thomas Hughes, Director, Office of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, to Director of Central Intelligence John McCone Noting new intelligence information on the Indian and Israeli nuclear programs, as well as the possibility of developments concerning Sweden, Hughes requested McCone to initiate a new estimate of nuclear proliferation trends, which would eventually become part of a October 1964 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE). Hughes enclosed draft “terms of reference,” that included questions about the possibility of “clandestine” weapons programs and new technological developments that could make weapons development “easier” (perhaps a reference to gas centrifuge technology that the 1964 NIE would discuss).
February 11, 1957	Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Syria, 'The Situation of Ambassador Chen’s Visit to the Syrian Foreign Minister' The Chinese Ambassador to Syria and the Syrian Foreign Minister discuss the timing of the Second Asian-African Conference and the Arab-Israeli conflict
1955	Report from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'List of Problems Between China and Other Asian-African Countries' A list of problems between China and other Asian-African countries
May 10, 1955	Report from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Comments on the Asian-African Conference from the Participating Countries After the Conference' Description of the reaction to the Asian-African Conference in both participating countries and capitalist ruled countries.
April 9, 1981	Special Assistant for NPI, NFAC, CIA, to Resource Management Staff, Office of Program Assessment et al, 'Request for Review of Draft Paper on the Security Dimension of Non-Proliferation' Just a few months into President Reagan’s first term his administration wanted to make its own mark on nonproliferation policy. The report suggests building “broader bilateral relationship[s]” and offering political and security incentives could persuade states considering developing nuclear weapons to cease these efforts.
December 28, 1956	Third World Reaction to Hungary and Suez, 1956: A Soviet Foreign Ministry Analysis Tugarinov wrote this overview of reactions to the events in Hungary and Suez by third world nations. Tugarinov reports that the events in Hungary and the Near East increased the prestige of the United States.