Detailed analysis of Western foreign policy toward the Middle East, the outcome of the Six-Day War, and Czechoslovakian military support of the United Arab Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic.

Detailed Czechoslovak report explaining the United Arab Republic's defeat in the Six-Day War.

Excerpts describing Czechoslovakian and other Eastern Bloc countries' involvement in the Six-Day War.

Czechoslovakia offers assistance to the United Arab Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic following their defeat in the Six-Day War with Israel.

Cover page to a long report on the outcome of the Six-Day War and Czechoslovakian relations with the United Arab Republic.

Nicolae Ceaușescu received Iranian Ambassador to Romania, Soltan Hossein Vakili Sanandaji, and they discussed developments in the Near East, specifically the ongoing conflict between Israel and Arab states. Ceaușescu suggested to the Ambassador that Iran should use its influence in the area to encourage other Arab states to seek a peaceful and realistic resolution to the conflict.

Badran and Kosygin met in Moscow on the eve of the Six-Day War. Badran submitted a long list of weapons which Cairo wanted to be airlifted immediately. After a late night discussion in the Politburo, Kosygin informed Badran that Moscow would be willing to airlift only some of the items on the Egyptian list; others would be supplied in a later date. During the first meeting with Badran, Kosygin advised the Egyptian government to think of ways to end the crisis with Israel, perhaps by granting Israeli ships free transit in the Straights of Tiran.

The document records the state of play in Syrian-Soviet relations prior to the Six-Day War. According to the author of the report negotiations between the Syrian Ba’ath delegation and Soviet authorities, which took place in Moscow during January 1967, were tense and uneasy because the Soviets were displeased by the provocative and aggressive Syrian policy toward Israel.

The document describes the negotiations between Soviet leaders and Nasser, which mainly focused on the conflict in the Middle East and the possible recognition of the GDR by the United Arab Republic. Nasser emphasized that there would be no direct talks between the UAR and Israel, but that the UAR would be willing to take part in a UN negotiated attempt to solve the conflict, upon the condition that Israel withdraw its troops from the occupied territories. Nasser was reluctant to follow the Soviet demand for a diplomatic recognition of the GDR.

Polish document describing the speech given by Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) on the actions undertaken by the Soviet leadership before and during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Brezhnev tells the CC CPSU plenum that the Arab struggle in the Middle East has both a class struggle and a national liberation dimension. Brezhnev blames Israeli aggression for the start of the war and Arab blunders and low morale for the humiliating defeat of the UAR forces. Given the success of the Israeli Defense Forces, the Soviets were forced to consider diplomatic and political methods for saving the Arab leadership. When Israeli forces did not stop their aggression against Syria, threatening to overrun the Syrian capital of Damascus, Brezhnev claims tells the CC CPSU that Soviet leadership warned the Americans that the Soviet Army would have to intervene and, at the same time, threatened the Israeli that any further actions would result in Soviet involvement in the war. Brezhnev claims that, since the war ended just hours after the Soviets had made their threats, the imperialist powers acquiesced to Soviet demands. This documents is a translation of the version the Soviet leadership sent to the United Polish Workers’ Party for the information of the Polish leadership.