Zhou Enlai reports to Mao Zedong on his talk with Zakharov about their strategic intentions and plans to cross the 38th parallel. Zakharov insists that one army should be moved to the Wonsan area to cover the southward-advancing flank, despite Zhou's disagreement with this move.

Zhou Enlai instructs the Chinese military officer observation group not to go south of the 38th parallel, but to split into two groups and examine the situations of different areas of Korea.

Telegram from Shtykov to Stalin (copied to the Soviet leadership) relaying a request from Kim Il Sung for military advisors.

Telegram from Stalin to North Korea advising that they reply to UN Secretary General Trygve Lie's concerns for treatment of POW's through a radio broadcast by a POW saying that prisoners are being treated well by the KPA.

Vasilevsky reports on the state of Korean fighter aviation regiments, damaged Soviet regiments in Korea, Korean maintenance crews and transport of battalions and munitions supplies to Korea, allowing Stalin to decide, pending further calculations, whether or not it would be logical to transfer aircraft to Pyongyang.

Stalin blames the recent success of the UN forces in Seoul on the inefficiency of the KPA’s Frontline Command and Soviet military advisors, as well erroneous use of tank tactics and overall combat strategy. Stalin provides a detailed list instructing military advisors, and especially Vasilyev, how to delpoy and manage Korean troops around Seoul.

The CPSU CC approves the draft telegram from Gromyko authorizing Shtykov's request for evacuation of Soviet specialists from North Korea.

Kim Il Sung requests that Koreans living in the Soviet Union be trained there for service in the Korean Army, explaining that the strong presence of the American military in Korea will not allow for on-site training. Shytkov attached his support of Kim’s request in this telegram to Stalin.

Detailed report from Minister Károly Pásztor on his meeting with Kim Il Sung on 17 February 1953.

A message from Gromyko to Stalin relaying the assessment of Shtykov that it would be prudent for the Soviet Union to withdraw some nonessential embassy personnel and specialists from North Korea. Gromyko advises that withdrawals should be considered only in consultation with North Korea and the appropriate Soviet ministeries.