Brezhnev discusses negotiations with the United States over the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This lengthy report was State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research's contribution to the first National Intelligence Estimate on the nuclear proliferation, NIE 100-6-57. Written at a time when the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom were the only nuclear weapons states, the “Fourth Country” problem referred to the probability that some unspecified country, whether France or China, was likely to be the next nuclear weapons state. Enclosed with letter from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Division of Research for USSR and Western Europe, to Roger Mateson, 4 June 1957, Secret

This telegram made by the Brazilian Embassy in Buenos Aires, verifies U.S. pressure on Argentina’s nuclear program, especially through Canada, with whom Argentina had a strategic partnership in the nuclear field. The telegram goes into depth on factors that underlie Argentina's decision not to sign the NPT, and its efforts to import the materials necessary for its nuclear program.

This memo, produced by the Argentine Ambassador in charge of the Scientific and Technical Affairs Division of the Argentine Foreign Ministry, alerts the Director of the Argentine Nuclear Commission Carlos Castro Madero that the new Carter administration will attempt to exert pressure on Brazil’s nuclear program and hinder its nuclear deal with West Germany. It notes that regardless of Carter’s nuclear policy, Brazil would “try by all means confirm its right to nuclear development.”

This cable reports the visit of the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Brazil. Issues related to non-proliferation dominated the meeting. Christopher emphasized the importance of Brazil strengthening its commitments to non-proliferation norms by signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Brazilian officials expected to improve the dialogue with the US administration after Brazil’s adherence to the MTCR.

This document describes the Computer Technology Associates’ (CTA) interest in investing in Brazil's space sector. In a scheduled visit to Brasília, Tom Velez, CEO at CTA, would discuss his company’s interest in producing 20 communication satellites using Brazilian technology and construction of the proper infrastructures to launch these satellites from CLA.

This cable reports the visit of Gylvan Meira Filho, President of the Brazilian Space Agency (AEB), to the Brazilian embassy in Washington. Meira Filho went to the US to meet with NASA’s officials to discuss the signature of a framework agreement between the two space agencies. The other objectives of the President of the AEB were to identify potential partners for Brazilian space activities and to signal the agency’s commitment with the MTCR’s norms.

This document reports the visit of Kenneth Fisher, Lockheed’s representative, to Brasília. During the meeting, Fisher argued that in order for Lockheed to start its operations in Brazil, the company required Brazilian adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime and the consent of the American government.

This report describes the meeting between the Brazilian diplomat Carmen Moura and Lockheed’s representatives Kenneth Fisher and Noel Horn. The main issue discussed at the meeting was the feasibility of the creation of the joint venture between Lockheed, the Russian Kruchinev and the Brazilian group Monteiro Aranha. The venture would utilize American made satellites from Lockheed, satellite launch vehicles from Kruchinev and the Brazilian launching site at Alcântara Launch Center.

On April 1993, Brazilian diplomats met once more with Robert Einhorn, now Deputy Assistant Secretary for Chemical Weapons and Proliferation. Einhorn was mainly concerned with the delay in the approval of the export control legislation in Brazil and wondered if the issue was not losing priority in the Brazilian government’s agenda. He also tried to discourage the development of Brazilian SLV by arguing that it would not be economically advantageous for the country.