1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
North America
Central America and Caribbean
South America
1926- 2016
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1894- 1971
October 27, 1962
Chinese embassy in Cuba discusses with a Cuban official the likelihood of a U.S. invasion and war. They also discuss the mobilization preparations and Castro's position on fighting a war with the United States.
Chinese embassy in Ghana discusses the situation in Cuba. Ghana proposes African-Asian delegation to inspect Cuban military establishments; also says the U.S. will attack Cuba at 9:30 pm on the evening of 27 or 28 October 1962, but does not identify the source of this information.
October 28, 1962
A conversation with the Chilean economic advisor. They discuss: American plane shot down over Cuba, possible invasion of Cuba and the mass mobilization needed to support Cuba.
October 25, 1962
In response to President Kennedy's letter protesting the placement of missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev proposes a resolution to the crisis. When the time seemed right he would offer to dismantle the missiles already on the island (the MRBMs or R-12s) if Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba.
November 2, 1962
A report from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba to the Military Intelligence Department describing the military situation of the US blockade of Cuba. It includes the US U-2 spy plane shot down and information regarding American troop and ship presence.
November 13, 1962
The conversation was recorded after the Cuban leader refused to see the Soviet envoy for three days in a reaction to the new demand. Castro starts by declaring his disagreement with the decision to remove the IL-28s but, assures Mikoyan that the revolutionary leadership discussed the issue and agreed to the removal. Mikoyan presents all his arguments to show that the withdrawal of the planes would end the crisis and make the US non-invasion pledge more credible. He acknowledges the “negative psychological effect” of the decision and reiterates that all the rest of the weapons would stay in Cuba so its security would be guaranteed without the obsolete planes. They also agree on the rules of verification of the withdrawal.
December 3, 1962
Protocol 71 gives details to the immediate fallout of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet perspective. Thanks to Castro’s so-called Armageddon letter and his five points, by December 1962 (date of this protocol), Khrushchev was calling the Cubans “unreliable allies.”
November 16, 1962
Protocol 66 is the first Malin note dated after the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 11 November. The tone of the protocol indicates that Castro is not pleased with Khrushchev's handling of the crisis, and there is a growing sense of distance between Cuba and the Soviet Union.
According to Protocol 63, Khrushchev probably assumed that Kennedy’s patience was at an end and the Cuban Missile Crisis might either be resolved or spin out of control, and the Kremlin again considered how it might respond to a US attack. If anyone suggested a preemptive strike, or even a retaliatory strike, against a target outside of the Caribbean, Malin did not note it for the official record.
November 9, 1962
The Chinese Embassy in Iraq passes on information from the Cuban Embassy about forces prepared by the CIA for an invasion of Cuba, claiming they included armed anti-Castro exiles of the Cuban Revolutionary Council as well as a separate group of "special agents committed to sabotage and subversion operations."