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1917- 1963

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Drozniak, Edward

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September 2, 1962	Note from Cuban Ambassador to Bulgaria, Salvador Garcia Aguero, to Bulgarian Foreign Minister, 2 September 1962 Warning about the content of Castro’s declaration with regard to US threats against Cuba. Reference to the media and other authorities copies of the declaration.
November 9, 1962	Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 9 November 1962 Van Roijen cables from Washington about a conversation he had with British Ambassador to the United States David Ormsby-Gore. Ormsby-Gore explains the possible reaction from Moscow to the defeat suffered in the crisis as twofold: Those who are of the opinion that Khrushchev will make a countermove, while those whose judgment is that Khrushchev has finally understood that the Americans in fact are willing to fight for their vital national interests has learned severe lessons for future Soviet policy in the Cold War. Both van Roijen and Ormsby-Gore that perhaps the most decisive moment of the whole crisis was the American blockade of Cuba herself. The cable concludes with Ormsby-Gore addressing the possibilities of hidden missiles in Cuba, to which he claims aerial reconnaissance has not produced any evidence to support this.
November 1, 1962	Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 1 November 1962 Dutch Ambassador to the United States J. Herman van Roijen sends a cable on a conversation he had with a member of the U.S. State Department. Firstly, the State Department was pleased to know Indonesian President Sukarno had not pledged support to Cuba during the crisis. Secondly, they hoped to make the point to Sukarno how alliance with the Soviets could not be relied upon, as the Cuban crisis and the Soviet abandonment of India have demonstrated. Thirdly, the Indonesian Ambassador Zain was going to pay six week visit to Jakarta, in an effort to promote U.S. economic support to Indonesia.
October 31, 1962	Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 31 October 1962 Boissevain writes about a conversation between Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa and Brazilian Ambassador Luis Bastian Pinto. The conversation revolves around Castro's Five Points, and Roa claims they are not aimed at the United States but rather the Soviet Union whose concession to remove the missiles greatly disturbed Castro. The Brazilian Ambassador though the Cubans asked too much, while Roa said these points are negotiable.
November 19, 1962	Memorandum of Conversation between Polish Leader Władysław Gomułka and British Journalist David Astor, 19 November 1962 (excerpt) Polish leader Władysław Gomułka and British journalist David Astor discuss the stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union in the situation of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
October 31, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Havana (Vidaković) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry Representatives from Brazil and Yugoslavia discuss the Brazilian proposal to the United Nations (1) denuclearization of Latin America, 2) Cuba will not interfere politically with its neighbors, and 3) guaranteed sovereignty for Cuba), about various leader's opinions on the resolution and about the difficulty that might be involved in the implementation of these policies.
October 31, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry The Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro tells the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry about Brazil's proposal to the United Nations (denuclearization of Latin America, Cuba will not export revolutionary operations, Cuban guarantee of independence) and about how difficult it might be to implement the various aspects of this resolution. For example, when it comes to discussions of the evacuation of Guantanamo, Americans "stop their ears."
November 2, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, to Yugoslav Embassies in Havana and Washington and the Yugoslav Mission to the United Nations, New York The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry relays to its embassies a summary of the Brazilian proposal on the Cuban Missile Crisis which, they say, mainly includes: the denuclearization of Latin America with inspections, Cuba's commitment to not "export" revolutionary operations, and guarantees to Cuba for sovereignty and independence. Allegedly, Castro welcomed the idea of the above plan. Brazil thinks that the USA could accept it after negotiations.
October 30, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Embassy in Rio (Barišić) to Yugoslav Foreign Ministry Fidel Castro, after his first contacts with Brazilian President João Goulart’s special envoy Albino Silva, accepted well the Brazilian thesis which contains following: Denuclearization of the whole of Latin America and the embargo on atomic weapons delivery; Inspection by UN; Cuba would commit neither to export revolution nor to carry out any subversive activities; Cuba would be given guarantees for keeping its sovereignty and independence. The USA will accept the plan after negotiations. Russians “couldn’t think of anything better.”
October 29, 1962	Telegram from Yugoslav Foreign Ministry to Yugoslav Embassies in Havana and Washington and Yugoslav Mission to the United Nations Brazilian President João Goulart emphasizes that the possibility of an adequate solution (to the Cuban Missile Crisis) could be increased if there were measures to suspend the quarantine (blockade) immediately, followed by corresponding and effective stoppage of weapons shipment to Cuba as well as determining obligations to prevent the spreading of nuclear weapons and the installation of bases. In his opinion the danger of war could increase significantly and worries of Brazil would grow as far as its own security was concerned, if such bases were installed in Cuba or any other part of LA. He also brought to the attention the proposal of Brazil in the UN for the denuclearization of Latin America.