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January 19, 1974	US Embassy India cable 0743 to State Department, 'India’s Nuclear Intentions' The Embassy assessed India's potential for the development of nuclear weapons amd concluded that “deeper economic problems,” among other considerations militated against a nuclear test in the near future, even though the Indian government had the capabilities to produce and test a device. While there were no rumors about a test as there had been in 1972, “we know little about relevant internal government debate.” All in all, the embassy believed that economic conditions “tip the likelihood of an early test to a lower level than previous years.” Russell Jack Smith, previously the deputy director for intelligence at the CIA, and then serving as special assistant to the ambassador (station chief), was one of the officials who signed off on this cable.
January 16, 1973	H. Daniel Brewster to Herman Pollack, 'Indian Nuclear Developments' The interagency group prepared a response to NSSM 156 on 1 September 1972 and it was sent to Kissinger. The summary of the study reproduced here includes the conclusion that an Indian test would be “a set-back to nonproliferation efforts” and that Washington should “do what [it] can to avert or delay” one. Thus, recommendations included a number of unilateral and multilateral actions that the United States government could take, noting that “given the poor state” of Indo-American relations, an “overly visible” U.S. effort would more likely speed up an Indian decision to test a device, Even non-US efforts were likely not to “be per se effective.”
August 3, 1972	Special National Intelligence Estimate SNIE 31-72, 'Indian Nuclear Developments and their Likely Implications' Prepared as part of the NSSM 156 policy review, this Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) concluded that the chances of India making a decision to test were “roughly even,” but the post-mortem analysis [see "Why now?," 18 May 1974] argued that based on its own findings, the conclusion ought to have been 60-40 in favor of a decision to test. In its analysis of the pros and cons of testing, the SNIE found that the “strongest factors impelling India to set off a test are: the belief that it would build up [its] international prestige; demonstrate India's importance as an Asian power; overawe its immediate South Asian neighbors; and bring enhanced popularity and public support to the regime which achieved it.” The drafters further noted that a test would be “extremely popular at home, where national pride is riding high” and that supporters of a test believed that it would make the world see India as “one of the world’s principal powers.” The arguments against a test included adverse reactions from foreign governments that provided economic assistance, but the estimate noted that foreign reactions were “becoming less important” to India.
February 23, 1972	Memorandum from Ray Cline, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, enclosing 'Possibility of an Indian Nuclear Test' At the request of Undersecretary of State John Irwin, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) prepared an assessment which included a detailed review of Indian’s nuclear facilities and their capacity to produce weapons-grade plutonium as well as capabilities to deliver nuclear weapons to a target. While India had signed agreements with Canada and the United States that nuclear reactors were to be used for peaceful purposes, the Indians were likely to claim that an explosive device for “peaceful” purposes was consistent with the agreements. Whether the Indians were going to test in the near future was in doubt. INR could not “rule out” one in the near future. Further, the “strongest incentive [to test] may well be the desire for the increased status of a nuclear power.” All the same, “it our judgment that a decision to authorize a test is unlikely in the next few months and may well be deferred for several years.” Weighing against a test were the financial and diplomatic costs, for example, “India's full awareness that assistance from the US and other countries (possibly including the USSR) would be jeopardized.”
April 2004	KGB Active Measures in Southwest Asia in 1980-82 Materials provided by former KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin to CWIHP, following the publication of the Working Paper No. 40, "The KGB in Afghanistan." As with all Mitrokhin’s notes, his compilation on Soviet “active measures” in South and Southwest Asia is based on other smuggled-out notes and was prepared especially for CWIHP. Please read the Notes on Sources for information on the nature and limitations of these documents.
February 18, 1977	CPSU CC Protocol #46/10, Instructions to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington for his Conversation with Vance on the Question of 'Human Rights' Response to the US State Department's protest of the arrest of Aleksandr Ginzburg, a prominent Soviet dissident, for alleged currency violations.
March 26, 1965	Minutes of Todor Zhivkov – Raul Castro Meeting in Sofia Zhivkov lays out his perspective on the place of Bulgaria within the Communist Camp. He also talks about the Balkans and the rift between Bulgaria and Romania. Both leaders discuss the Chinese accusations of Soviet Revisionism. Raul Castro talks about the strength of the communist movements in Latin America and the prospects for successful social revolutions in Venezuela, Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Brazil.
May 18, 1961	Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union, 'Soviet Newspapers’ Comments on the South Korean Military Coup' According to Chinese analysis, the Soviet press described the Park Chung Hee coup in South Korea as reactionary and led by the United States.
May 21, 1961	Cable from the Chinese Embassy in North Korea, 'Contents of the May 18th North Korean Party Central Standing Committee Meeting' A Chinese report on a Meeting of the Central Standing Committee in which the North Koreans negatively reflected on the Park Chung Hee coup in South Korea.
May 16, 1990	CPSU CC Memo with extract of Politburo Protocol #187 of 16 May 1990 and other attachments Memo concerns a directive for the discussions with US Secretary of State James Baker between May 16 and 19, 1990 in Moscow. There are also attachments concerning the quantity of warheads , cooperation, and the armed forces of the US and USSR.