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Documents

June 27, 1991

National Intelligence Daily for Thursday, 27 June 1991

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for Thursday, 27 June describes the latest developments in Yugoslavia, USSR, Cambodia, Philippines and India.

October 24, 1989

National Intelligence Daily for Tuesday, 24 October 1989

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 24 October 1989 describes the latest developments in the Soviet Union, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, and Colombia.

August 10, 1989

National Intelligence Daily for Thursday, 10 August 1989

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 10 August 1989 describes the latest developments in Israel, Lebanon, Iran, Panama, the Soviet Union, China, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, South Korea, and West Germany.

December 7, 1985

Defense Intelligence Agency cable to [excised location], 'Pakistan-China: Nuclear Weapons Production and Testing'

A State Department telegram discussing the possible Chinese-Pakistani nuclear assistance and reports that Pakistan had acquired a nuclear weapon in October of 1985.

1983

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, 'Pakistan: Security Planning and the Nuclear Option,' Report 83-AR

A State Department assessment of Pakistan’s security situation, its nuclear program and the future of Pakistani planning. A range of subjects are covered in depth including, Pakistan’s perception of its security situation, major foreign policy dilemmas such as India and Afghanistan, the development of a “nuclear options” and American non-proliferation responses.

November 19, 1982

Henry S. Rowen, National Intelligence Council, to DDCI [Deputy Director of Central Intelligence McMahon], 19 November 1982, with attached memorandum from National Intelligence Council staffer [name excised], 'Pakistan'

Despite the concerns about sharing the ALR-69 radar warning receiver with Pakistan for fear of it falling into Chinese hands, CIA officials argue that failure to meet Pakistani demands would lead to a “serious blow to U.S. worldwide nonproliferation efforts.”

June 4, 1982

Note for [name excised] from [name excised], 'State/INR Request for Update of Pak SNIE, and Assessment of Argentine Nuclear Program'

A planned update of the Special National Intelligence Estimate 31-32/81 concluded that Pakistan’s nuclear program was continuing and new evidence suggested a “significant” Chinese role in the design of the weapons. Despite this new evidence, CIA estimates suggest that the required amount of fissile material for weapons production would not be available as early as had been predicted, and that a Pakistani nuclear test was not imminent.

August 20, 1981

Acting Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence, National Foreign Assessment Center, to Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, 'Warning Report-Nuclear Proliferation'

In response to an IAEA report that Pakistan diverted plutonium from the Karachi nuclear power plant, a CIA analysis suggests that the Pakistanis “were not overly concerned” about these events. Of greater concern to regional security and stability was the discussions of the sale of F-16 fighter-bombers as part of a U.S. aid package to ensure Pakistan’s cooperation in the covert efforts against Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

March 23, 1981

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, 'Pakistan and the US: Seeking Ways to Improve Relations'

A State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research report on the desire of the Pakistani leadership to improve relations with the U.S. and negotiate a more substantial aid package. The report warns against becoming too close to General Zia, as close relations with him “might harm future relations” should he be swept from power.

April 2004

KGB Active Measures in Southwest Asia in 1980-82

Materials provided by former KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin to CWIHP, following the publication of the Working Paper No. 40, "The KGB in Afghanistan." As with all Mitrokhin’s notes, his compilation on Soviet “active measures” in South and Southwest Asia is based on other smuggled-out notes and was prepared especially for CWIHP. Please read the Notes on Sources for information on the nature and limitations of these documents.

Pagination