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February 19, 1960

A.A. Wells, Director, Division of International Affairs, to Philip J. Farley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Disarmament and Atomic Energy, 'Control of and Cooperation in Gas Centrifuge Research and Development Program'

The development of the gas centrifuge method, according to this report, would make production of U-235 (and by extension, nuclear weapons) possible for as many as 20-30 foreign countries. The U.S. is thus forced to consider its strategy for how to limit proliferation despite this new, cheap technology.

December 7, 1959

C. L. Marshall, Director, Division of Classification, to A. A. Wells, Director, Division of International Affairs, 'Cooperation in the Field of Gas Centrifuge'

US Atomic Energy Commission classification director C. L. Marshall explains to international affairs director A. A. Wells that the design for the gas centrifuge must be classified for fear of providing an “unfriendly nation” a low-energy consuming method for “the separation of heavy isotopes…an important part of a [nuclear] weapons program.”

December 15, 1977

Telegram 085579 from the Romanian Embassy in Washington, DC, to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

U.S.-Korea relations are marred by concerns over the withdrawal of American troops from the ROK, human rights in South Korea, and the Koreagate scandal.

October 22, 1977

Telegram 085374 from the Romanian Embassy in Washington, DC, to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Upon Jimmy Carter's election, the DPRK makes efforts to initiate a dialogue with the US government. Carter responds positively but with the condition of including the ROK representatives.

March 9, 1973

Meeting Minutes between Director Kim and Counselor Pierce

Director Kim and Counselor Pierce discuss about the visit of U.S. officials to Seoul and a clash along the DMZ.

November 4, 1962

Soviet Report on Conversation with US Congressional Staff

Report on the relief in Washington after the height of the crisis had passed and the possibility of the US pledging not to invade Cuba, provide ports and other government facilities to Cuban emigres or training Cuban emigres on US territory. The report also highlighted the American reluctance on the normalization of economic relations and the Guantanamo base.

October 27, 1962

Soviet Intelligence Report on Meeting with Scali and American Proposal

Report on the exchanges between the KGB Station Chief in Washington and ABC News correspondent John Scali. They discuss possible Soviet actions in West Berlin in the case of an American invasion of Cuba and an American offer not to invade Cuba if Fidel Castro publicly pledges to dismantle the long-range missiles. Washington would agree to let Cuba keep the defensive-type missiles and might make a secret pledge to withdraw the American troops in the South.

October 31, 1962

Soviet Report on the American Preparation of War During the Cuban Missile Crisis

Report on the American mass media and preparations for war. "Washington is engulfed in an atmosphere of war hysteria."

October 24, 1962

Soviet Report to Reaction Inside the US to Kennedy's Decision to Blockade Cuba

Report on the reaction among DC politicians to Kennedy's decision to blockade Cuba.

October 24, 1962

Soviet Report on US Politicians Who Support Military Action Against Cuba

KGB Chief Semichastny reports on US politicians who support military intervention in Cuba, including Nelson Rockefeller and the Pentagon leadership.

Pagination