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Documents

March 14, 1972

Report from Bartha János, 'Visit of the DPRK's ambassador'

A report by Bartha Janos on the visit of North Korean ambassador Pak Gyeong-sun, discussing North Korea’s relations with Netherlands and Sweden.

December 15, 1955

Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov for 15 December 1955

Ivanov tells Nam Il that the Polish government is in favor of Sweden’s and Switzerland’s proposal to reorganize the Neutral Nations Korean Armistice Supervisory Commission. Nam Il says he is still unsure about the motives of the Swedish and Swiss governments.

December 12, 1955

Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov for 12 December 1955

Ivanov meets with Chinese Ambassador Pan Zili. Pan reports that Sweden and Switzerland are working to reorganize the Neutral Nations Korean Armistice Supervisory Commission.

June 11, 1976

George Vest to the Secretary of State, 'London Nuclear Suppliers Meeting'

This document provides an overview of the London Nuclear Suppliers' Meeting which included the addition of the five newest countries to the original seven. Most old and new members were receptive when Washington lobbied them to support a “long term and stable regime of restraint” on the export of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technology. While the French were supportive of the moratorium proposal, the Germans were uncomfortable with it, not least because of the implications for their deal with Brazil.

May 25, 1957

Collection of Reports from Polish Military Attaches Around the World

Reports from Washington, Ottawa, Cairo, Berlin, Brussells, Rome, Stockholm, and Helsinki discussing events that occurred from January-May 1957. Most of the contents revolved around meetings with other foreign officials and actions of embassy's host country.

March 28, 1973

Letter, Ahmet H. Ozbudun to C.V. Narasimhan, "Growing Ties with Pyongyang"

Ozbudun sends Narasimhan a report on growing ties with Pyongyang, UNCURK session, document concerning last week's confidential letter, and North-South dialogue.

December 10, 1964

From the Diary of V. Kh. Man'ko, Record of a Conversation with the Correspondent of the Swedish Communist Party Newspaper, 'Ny Dag,' Karl Shtaf, 28 November 1964

Shtaf mentions that he had a conversation with an Argentinian Communist Party leader in Prague, who reported about his trip to Cuba and meeting with Guevara. He also discusses the current situation of the Communist Party in Sweden.

January 20, 1966

National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-66, 'The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation'

This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.

February 28, 1978

TELEGRAM 066.569 from the Romanian Embassy in Pyongyang to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Swedish and Finnish governments pressure the DPRK to pay back its debts, while the PRC grants North Korea a loan to partially offset these costs.

October 21, 1964

National Intelligence Estimate NIE 4-2-64, 'Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Over the Next Decade'

This US analysis of the likelihood of nuclear proliferation during the next decade was finished only days after the first Chinese nuclear test on 16 October. The report analyses the implications of this test, as well as programs in India, Israel, Sweden, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, and others. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) argued that India was the only new state likely to develop nuclear weapons, concluding that “there will not be a widespread proliferation …over the next decade.”

Pagination