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Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Cuba's National Capitol Building, January 2010.

Central America and Caribbean

Cuba

Aerial view of National Mall

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Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

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President Ronald Reagan, Vice-President Bush, and oviet General Secretary Gorbachev

United States-Soviet Relations

Fidel Castro, 1959.

Castro, Fidel

1926- 2016

Cuban Foreign Relations

Nikita Khrushchev at the UNGA, 1962.

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich

1894- 1971

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Poland

Photograph of Secretary General of the United Nations U Thant

Thant, U

1909- 1974

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Anastas Mikoyan in 1959

Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich

1895- 1978

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Photograph of John F. Kennedy in 1963

Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald)

1917- 1963

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Bastian Pinto, Luiz Leivas

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Sino-Indian Border War, 1962

Sino-Soviet Relations

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November 7, 1962	Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 7 November 1962 The cable focuses on a report from the German embassy that in several places in Cuba, Soviet weapons are hidden under cement. There is still no progress on the dialogue between Fidel Castro and Anastas Mikoyan.
November 2, 1962	Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 2 November 1962 The cable is centered around Cuba and the Organization of American States (OAS). Van Roijen and Ward P. Allen discuss a cable intercepted from Venezuela about possible attempts of sabotage by pro-Castro organizations in Caracas. However, there is no report from the U.S. Embassy Caracas to confirm this. There are, however, protests being reported in the American-aligned Latin American countries, which is seen as an attempt by Cuba to stir revolutionary sentiment in these countries. The size and frequency of these protests by pro-Castro and communist groups is very limited.
November 2, 1962	Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 2 November 1962 The cable concerns a conversation between Dutch Ambassador to the United States van Roijen and Director Ward P. Allen of the State Department's Bureau of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, regarding further actions of the Organization of American States (OAS) in the aftermath of the Cuban crisis. Allen made note that he had very little information regarding Cuba and how Cuba would fit into future dealings with the OAS.
November 2, 1962	Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 2 November 1962 The letter begins with Boissevain criticizing Castro's speech, claiming he could have written it before it was ever delivered. The speech concerned Castro's meeting with UN Secretary General U Thant, and the contents of the speech were such that the Cuban people were kept at boiling point. Boissevain claims this is a necessity to make the people accept the sacrifices demanded of them and forget the hardships they face. Castro's exclamations that "we are above all Marxist-Leninists" raised applause, but Soviet support has died down. Boissevain suspects Anastas Mikoyan will have a hard time reasoning with Castro after the disappointment in the eyes of Cuba.
November 2, 1962	Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 2 November 1962 Boissevain writes a cable detailing a meeting between Fidel Castro and UN Secretary General U Thant. Cuba refused any inspection of missile silos, if the Americans did not uphold their pledge to not threaten Cuba with invasion. The Five Points were mentioned as preconditions for peace and Castro pledged Cuba was ready and willing to work towards peace. It appears Castro was aware of Soviet considerations for "global politics" as the reason behind the Soviet withdrawal of missiles.
November 1, 1962	Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 1 November 1962 Dutch Ambassador to the United States J. Herman van Roijen sends a cable on a conversation he had with a member of the U.S. State Department. Firstly, the State Department was pleased to know Indonesian President Sukarno had not pledged support to Cuba during the crisis. Secondly, they hoped to make the point to Sukarno how alliance with the Soviets could not be relied upon, as the Cuban crisis and the Soviet abandonment of India have demonstrated. Thirdly, the Indonesian Ambassador Zain was going to pay six week visit to Jakarta, in an effort to promote U.S. economic support to Indonesia.
November 1, 1962	Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 1 November 1962 Boissevain reports on the aftermath of the crisis and its effects on Cuba, especially in Havana. Rather than the majority being in support of government actions while a minority supported the opposition, there is a public outcry from the masses about the Soviet handling of the crisis. Fidel Castro's response is a speech to the people explaining the Soviet reasons for their actions, while the Soviet Union voices its support for Castro's Five Points and sends Anastas Mikoyan to Havana as a "troubleshooter."
October 31, 1962	Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 31 October 1962 Boissevain writes about a conversation between Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa and Brazilian Ambassador Luis Bastian Pinto. The conversation revolves around Castro's Five Points, and Roa claims they are not aimed at the United States but rather the Soviet Union whose concession to remove the missiles greatly disturbed Castro. The Brazilian Ambassador though the Cubans asked too much, while Roa said these points are negotiable.
October 29, 1962	Letter from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 29 October 1962 Boissevain speaks on the domestic situation in Cuba immediately after the end of the Missile Crisis. There are many counterrevolutionary groups who worry that current UN supervision of dismantling of the Soviet missile sites will preclude a U.S.-led invasion of Cuba, and perhaps might be the prelude to a normalizing of relations between Cuba and the United States. Raul Castro gives a speech saying the dismantling of the Soviet missile sites is a run-up to new Cuban demands, especially toward the evacuation of the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo. Raul goes on to address his brother Fidel, with assurances unity from the people, and obedience to any orders he issues. This raises the fear of what future demands Fidel may raise in the aftermath of this crisis.
October 29, 1962	Cable from Dutch Embassy, Havana (Boissevain), 29 October 1962 Boissevain writes after the conclusion of the crisis the Cuban response to the Tripartite Agreement. Fidel Castro proclaimed that no guarantee would be sufficient until all of the following had ceased: the naval and economic blockade, American aid to anti government forces and espionage, piracy from the United States and Puerto Rico, American military flights over Cuba, and dismantling the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay.