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November 9, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 11:30 a.m., Friday

Pinto meets with Anastas Mikoyan and Fidel Castro to discuss Brazilian-Soviet-Cuban relations.

November 7, 1962

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 5:30 p.m., Wednesday

Pinto describes the current situation in Cuba from the perspective of the Brazilian Embassy in Havana. He says, "The country continues entirely mobilized for the defense. The attitude of the Government seems to be more cautious. Habituated for years of the threat and with the blockade in front of Havana, the revolutionary government is plainly conscious that the danger has not passed and can reemerge at any moment."

November 5, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Havana (Bastian Pinto), 5:30 p.m., Monday

Pinto relays the message that Mikoyan intends to remain in Cuba at least one week, permiting a complete review of relations between Cuba and Russia, in face of the last events.

December 11, 1962

Documents Concerning Conversations in Moscow between Cuban Communist Official Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Soviet Leader Nikita Khrushchev

The report of a conversation in Moscow between Cuban Communist Official Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and Soviet Leader Nikita Khrushchev, discussing Soviet-Cuban relations and public announcements of support.

December 2, 1962

Confidential Memo from Cuban Mission to the United Nations Concerning Anastas Mikoyan’s Conversations with US President John F. Kennedy (and Secretary of State Dean Rusk), with cover note from Cuban President Dorticos to Foreign Minister Roa

A report from the Cuban Mission to the UN concerning a conversation with Anastas Mikoyan and US President John F. Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. The three are mostly focused on discussing US-Latin American diplomatic relations, and concerns over American military presence in Latin America, specifically the US fly-overs. Kennedy continues to reiterate the US's position on 'no US invasion of Cuba.'

November 16, 1962

Record of Conversation between Mikoyan and Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, Havana, 16 November 1962

The conversation takes place soon after the IL-28 crisis, which gives Mikoyan a chance to patch up the relationship with trade agreements and promises of future aid and industrial cooperation. Near the end of the conversation, Guevara and Mikoyan discuss the theory of revolutionary struggle. Guevara shares his vision that “further development of the revolutions in Latin America must follow the line of simultaneous explosions in all countries.” Mikoyan cautions him, pointing to the Soviet experience and using the metaphor of the rebellion on the battleship “Potemkin.” Hinting at further disagreement ahead, he gently registers his disagreement with the Cuban leader’s drive to ignite revolution in the hemisphere.

November 13, 1962

Record of Conversation between Mikoyan and Fidel Castro, Havana

The conversation was recorded after the Cuban leader refused to see the Soviet envoy for three days in a reaction to the new demand. Castro starts by declaring his disagreement with the decision to remove the IL-28s but, assures Mikoyan that the revolutionary leadership discussed the issue and agreed to the removal. Mikoyan presents all his arguments to show that the withdrawal of the planes would end the crisis and make the US non-invasion pledge more credible. He acknowledges the “negative psychological effect” of the decision and reiterates that all the rest of the weapons would stay in Cuba so its security would be guaranteed without the obsolete planes. They also agree on the rules of verification of the withdrawal.

November 11, 1962

Telegram from Nikita Khrushchev to Anastas Mikoyan

This telegram, written in Khrushchev's stream-of-consciousness style, outlines the rationale behind the decision to remove the missiles from Cuba that caused the crisis: It was much better to end the crisis by giving up planes that were already obsolete—to show that the Soviet Union and Cuba had fulfilled all the promises Khrushchev had given Kennedy—and consequently to expect, and demand, full compliance with the non-invasion pledge on the part of the United States, than to retain the planes and give the Americans a justification to violate their pledge. The telegram also spells out, in Khrushchev’s words, of the reasons why the weapons were deployed to Cuba in the first place.

July 12, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 41

Protocol 41 details a meeting on a group of economic advisers sent to Cuba from the Soviet Union.

November 1, 1962

Mikoyan Cable to Central Committee of the CPSU about his conversation with US Permanent Representative to the UN Stevenson

Mikoyan reported his conversation with US Representative to the UN Stevenson. The issues discussed include: An American non-aggression commitment against Cuba, the removal of the "quarantine", the methods for control of dismantling and dispatching of missiles, the normalization of relations between the US and their Latin American allies with Cuba, the liquidation of the US base in Guantanamo, the US proposal to remove ground-air missiles from Cuba, and the preliminary agreement between the US and the USSR over the issues to be discussed by the Security Council.

Pagination