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Documents

September 1, 1953

CPSU Central Committee Decision

Kuznetsov (Soviet ambassador to China) should be informed of the outcome of the United Nations political conference on Korea, at the request of the Government of the People's Republic of China.

March 14, 1953

Ciphered Telegram from Razuvaev to Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai

Telegram from Razuvaev discussing POWs and what precedents established at the Geneva Conference must be met. Razuvaev also asks whether their side is ready for immediate repatriation of seriously ill and seriously wounded prisoners of UN troops.

July 20, 1951

Ciphered Telegram from Mao Zedong to Filippov [Stalin]

Telegram from Mao to Stalin discussing the points of agreement and disagreement between the Korean-Chinese and Anglo-American representatives of armistice negotiations.

August 3, 1953

Confidential Memorandum, Before Agreeing to the Armistice Agreement

When the United States agreed to a truce talk to end the Korea War, President Syngman Rhee disapproved. He opposed the truce and tried to attack these peace proceedings through a serious of events- such as releasing thousands of prisoners of war and creating turmoil for the US government. In order to persuade Rhee to accept the armistice defense, the US dispatches Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson to meet with the South Korean president in a series of bargaining discussions. Eventually, under certain conditions and a mutual defense pact with the US, Rhee agrees to the armistice.

1954

Freedom to Non-Repatriated Prisoners of War

This note warns that the communists will try to convince the world that these “freed” prisoners are not really freed and during this processing and resettlement period the world will be watching the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China's actions.

1954

The POW Scandal in Korea

According to A.B Carey, one of the lessons learned from fighting the Kremlin and its “communism” ideology is evidently seen amongst the Korean and Chinese prisoners of war. Both groups of POW not only disapprove of the communism but would also actively fight against it if they had the opportunity. Carey uses ten ideas which denounce the Kremlin as the one responsible for the lies and bellicosities during the Cold War. He also proceeds to demonstrate ways the free world can defeat this communist caucus.

November 1, 1951

Ciphered Telegram No. 25465 from Beijing, Mao Zedong to Cde. Filippov [Stalin]

Mao writes to Stalin discussing strategies for a proposal cease hostilities at the front line, and establish a line of demarcation between the two sides.

July 4, 1953

Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov to Soviet Ambassador in Beijing

Molotov writes to the Soviet Ambassador in Beijing discussing the Korean War armistice.

July 10, 1951

Letter from General Ridgeway to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a Ceasefire Negotiations in Korea

Report from Ridgway, Commander in Chief of the United Nations forces in Korea on meetings between the UN Command and North Korea to negotiate an armistice in Korea.

August 9, 1966

On the Korean War, 1950-1952, and the Armistice Negotiations

A survey of Soviet and Chinese involvement in the Korean War compiled in 1966 by an unidentified members of the staff of the Soviet Foreign Ministry archive. The apparent
purpose of this internal history was to provide background information for the small group of Soviet officials who were at that time engaged in discussions with the People’s Republic of China and North Vietnam over possible Soviet assistance to the Viet Cong in their war with the United States.

Pagination